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ABSTRACT
The manner in which governments plan, make decisions
and carry out those decisions is a concept which has always
been of importance to planners, public policy-makers, systems
analysts and the like. In fact, there is often a direct link
between planning and public policy decision-making.
This thesis focuses on regulatory decision-making,
analyzing the decision-making process of the Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE), with respect to
the proposed Medical Area Total Energy Plant (MATEP).
Of particular importance are the range and com-
plexity of standards, considerations and criteria which go
into making regulatory decisions consistent with the public
interest.
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INTRODUCTION
On 31 January 1978, the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) ruled that operation
of six diesel engines designed to provide electric power as
part of the proposed Medical Area Total Energy Plant (MATEP)
would be "potentially injurious to human life and public
health". This decision represents what may be the final point
in an extremely long and often turbulent decision process re-
lated to the power plant.
The proposed $110 million plant is a project of
Harvard University, involving almost fifteen years of plan-
ning. The primary purpose of MATEP is to supply electricity,
steam heat and chilled water for air conditioning to Harvard
University, eleven affiliated medical and teaching institu-
tions and a recently completed housing development, all in the
Mission Hill (Roxbury) area of Boston. As proposed, the plant
will occupy a 1.7 acre site at Brookline Avenue and Francis
Street (See Appendix A). A previously formed consortium of
these institutions, the Medical Area Service Corporation
(MASCO), would have responsibility for operation of the faci-
lity.
The concept of a total energy plant may be an econo-
mically sound and energy-saving idea. Estimates of potential
savings for MASCO members range from $1.8 to $2.3 million
annually, and it is anticipated that patients would realize
savings from $2 to $3 per day on the bed rates at the hospitals
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the plant would serve. In addition, MATEP is expected to
provide $1.5 million annually in taxes to the city of Boston.
Since details of the proposal were announced in
1974 however, the process leading to the final decision re-
garding the plant's construction has been long and arduous.
MATEP has been the subject of intense opposition from groups
and individual-residents from the Mission Hill, Brookline,
Fenway, and Jamaica Plain communities, as well as from
opponents such as the Boston Edison Company. Community
groups and residents have expressed concern over a number
of matters related to the project and its construction. One of the
key issuesrevolves around the hazardous pollution and health
effects that the project will produce.
The concerns of Boston Edison have been primarily
economic in nature since they currently supply electricity
to the MASCO institutuions, and according to a company
spokesman, "stand to lose a lot of good customers if this
thing is built ".
From a regulatory standpoint, DEQE, under the
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
(EOEA), has responsibility for deciding whether or not the
plant can be built, based on Federal and state standards for
environmental air quality. Receipt of an Air Quality Permit,
issued by DEQE would be the final regulatory hurdle for MASCO
in its plans to construct the total energy plant.
The MATEP issue is important for two reasons. First,
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the total energy plant is a conceptually sound idea. It
seeks to provide needed energy services at reduced costs
to MASCO's affiliated institutions. In addition, it attempts
to minimize the impact several smaller, but widely scattered
energy plants might have on the community. Therefore, it may
be an idea with wider application. Second, although MATEP
meets currently established standards for ambient air quality,
in meeting its cost reduction objective,MATEP may endanger
(or at least adversely affect) the health and lives of the
critically receptive community in which it is to be located.
Thus MATEP may be a good energy/cost saving idea, but a bad
idea for public health. The irony underlying this issue is
that a total energy plant proposed by a medical coporation,
to be located in a medical area, may possibly be contrary
to good public health.
DEQE has playeda critical role in resolving this
dilemma. The issues and evidence involved in DEQE's
decision-making process are many and are tangled. Not the
least of these is the fact that traditionally, DEQE is a
technically oriented agency whose regulatory activity is
rooted in engineering standards and formula, with little
experience in the more qualitative judgments involved in
ensuring and safeguarding the public health.
The MATEP proposal has presented DEQE with a real
problem and provides a unique example of the range and com-
plexity of standards, considerations and criteria which go
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into making regulatory decisions consistent with the public
interest.
This thesis investigates and evaluates the
decision-making process employed by DEQE in the MATEP case.
The analysis is divided into four major areas,
In Chapter One DEQE is examined in an historical
perspective, considering how and why it came into existence
in order to define the goals of the agency. Here is included
the legislative history of the department as well as a sum-
mary of those agencies which preceded it.
Chapter Two is devoted to constructing two models
for decision-making. The first represents an ideal model
that can be used to analyze DEQE's activities on the MATEP
proposal. The second represents an espoused model for
DEQE decision-making as required by department regulations.
Chapter Three focuses on the MATEP case, with
particular attention to DEQE's role and decision-making
process. Included here is a comprehensive chronology of
events involved in the MATEP case.
Chapter Four analyzes the outcome of DEQE's actions
based on it espoused goals versus actual strategies, the
impact of the process on the various actors, and the utility
of the process followed compared with the model formulated.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE HISTORY OF BOSTON AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AND
THE EVOLUTION OF DEQE
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE BOSTON METROPOLITAN AREA
The Boston metropolitan area has had regulatory
activity for air pollution control for more than 100 years.
Legislative authority for control of air pollution
by a responsible public agency was first established in
Massachusetts in 1869 when the state Board of Health was
created. At that time, air pollution control was included in
the Board of Health's environmental sanitation program. For
most of its early history, the principal focus of air pollu-
tion control dealt with the problem of smoke emissions.
In 1901, the Legislature enacted a General Law to
control the emission of dark smoke from sources other than
locomotives and brick kilns. The effectiveness of this law
was reduced by "special-interest" amendments which excluded
public utility corporations, woodburning plants, and pottery
kilns. A citizen's committee, formed to address the problem
of the law's effectiveness, succeeded in prompting the Boston
Chamber of Commerce to file a petition with the General Court,
titled "An Act to Provide for the Abatement of Smoke in the
City of Boston and Vicinity". Subsequently, this act became
Chapter 651 of the Acts of 1910.
The Act established the Boston Smoke District and
designated responsibility for administration and enforce-
ment of its provisions to the Board of Gas and Electric Light
Commissioners, one of one hundred and five boards and commis-
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sioners in existence within the state government at the time.
The Act provided for the regulation of smoke emissions only.
The board had no authority to control the emission of flash,
cinders, fumes, odors, or any other air pollutants. It did
however, provide for an objective standard for determining the
density of smoke, as opposed to simply specifying dark or
dense grey smoke. In addition, the Act classified stacks
according to size, established penalties for violations and
provided for a staff for inspection and enforcement.
The Smoke District included the cities of Boston,
Cambridge, Somerville, Everett, Chelsea, and the town of
Brookline, and encompassed an area of sixty-six square miles
with a population of approximately one million. Grouping
several municipalities into a single smoke control district
was a new concept in the regulation of smoke emissions. The
Boston Smoke District was the first multi-municipal air pol-
lution control district in the country.
In 1919, the numerous boards and commissions of
the Commonwealth were consolidated into twenty departments.
Administration of the Boston Smoke District and enforcement
of related laws were placed under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Public Utilities.
In 1930, a Smoke Inspection Division, with a
Director and a five member advisory board, was created.
Legislation that same year required that new power plants,
blast furnaces, incinerators and large heating plants,
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receive approval of the Director of Smoke Inspection, The
strict enforcement of the provisions of the law met with.
considerable opposition. The law was repealed in 1933, and
the advisory board eliminated.
Between 1934 and 1954, relatively minor changes
were made in the actual smoke law (Chapter 641 of the Acts
of 1910), but the Smoke District continued to be expanded
and reorganized with the objective of a more effective air
pollution control program.
In 1954, the Division of Smoke Inspection was trans-
ferred from the Department of Public Utilities to the Depart-
ment of Public Health. As the smoke law provided only limited
air pollution control powers, the Department of Public
Health filed repeated petitions with the Legislature for
additional authority which it deemed necessary to regulate
air pollution of all types from all sources. A legislative
study conducted in 1959 pointed to the need for a more compre-
hensive air pollution control program:
The invisible gases and the tiny particles that now
pollute our environment are less felt, but are more to
be feared, than the layers of soot that once infiltrated
Boston's homes. Metropolitan Boston is in the first
stages of what could become a very severe air pollution
condition arising from a multiplicity of diverse,
dispersed sources. 1
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Despite the findings of the study and the numerous
petitions by the Department of Public Health, legislative
action was slow. It was not until a severe soot-fall took
place in South Boston on 13 May 1960 that the Legislature
began action to attempt to deal more comprehensively with
air pollution.
Legislation that year (Chapter 646, Acts of 1960,
Section 142B of Chapter 111, General Laws) replaced the
Boston Smoke District with the Metropolitan Air Pollution
Control District (MAPCD), which included Boston and 29
contiguous cities and towns with an area of 320 square miles.
Air pollution control was assigned to the Department of
Environmental Sanitation, in the Department of Public Health:
TABLE 1
DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION
8
METROPOLITAN AREA
POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT
The new legislation was not as comprehensive as one
might expect. Ostensibly, under the rules and regulations
(which took effect 1 August 1961), the Department of Public
Health was given the authority to regulate all sources of
atmospheric pollution within the District. Atmospheric
pollution was defined as "the presence in the ambient air
space of one or more air contaminants or combinations thereof
in such quantities and of such duration as to (a) cause a
nuisance; (b) be injurious or, on the basis of current infor-
mation, be potentially injurious to human or animal life, to
vegetation, or to property; or (c) reasonably interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment of life and property or the conduct
of business." 2
Most major sources of pollution, notably from indus-
trial facilities and electric generating stations, were left
virtually unregulated. In addition, no control was exerted
over highly toxic substances, or invisible emissions. Instead,
the primary concerns seemed to focus on areas such as dumps
and junk yards:
For two years following the adoption of the 1961 rules
and regulations, a concerted campaign to stop all open
burning of rubbish, trash, demolition materials, scrap
automobiles and scrap wire was carried out... In April
1961, there were 47 dumps in the District... today there
are none... In April 1961 there were 65 large auto body
junk yards in the MAPCD... today open burning of scrap
autos and wire has been completely stopped... 3
In a 1970 evaluation of the Department of Public
Health, the Bureau of Air Use Management (BAUM) was cited as
having "failed to establish adequate regulations for systema-
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tically controlling all of the major polluters, particularly
industrial sources", and the Metropolitan Air Pollution Con-
trol District was reported as being "less than aggressive
in enforcing BAUM regulations."4
These reports suggest that officials at BAUM were
more concerned with the negative economic impact of actually
enforcing regulations than with the environmental consequences
of ignoring industrial pollution offenders. This perspective
translated into a slow response to pollution complaints, and
an even slower response to confirmed violations.
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN POLLUTION CONTROL
BACKGROUND
The first Congressional action with respect to
the problems of air pollution occurred in 1955 with the
passage of PL 84-159 which authorized the Public Health Ser-
vice to conduct air pollution research. The $5 million
authorized by the Act covered expenses for fiscal years
1956-60.5
The Clean Air Act of 1960 (PL 88-206) provided for
a series of steps, culminating in legal action that states,
municipalities and the federal government could take to end
interstate and intrastate pollution. In 1965, a second title
(PL 89-272) was added to the 1963 Act, directing the Secre-
tary of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) to establish emis-
sion standards for new motor vehicles. (The first standards
for hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide exhaust emissions were
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established in 1966, and were applicable to most new gas-
powered motor vehicles beginning with the 1968 model year).6
The Clean Air Act of 1967 (PL 90-148) substantially
strengthened the powers of local state and federal authori-
ties with respect to pollution control. It embodied the
concept that air cleanup required a national effort, but
specified that the states should retain primary authority for
implementation.7  The Act authorized the Secretary of HEW to
designate air quality regions throughout the country and to
enforce air quality standards in the control regions if the
states failed to adopt standards as well as acceptable pollu-
tion abatement plans within a designated time period. The
1967 Act also provided full federal financing for regional
control commissions, which were to be established by the state
governors.8
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (PL 91-604)
were signed into effect 31 December 1970. The Act was re-
ferred to as "the most comprehensive air pollution control
bill in U.S. history"9 , and authorized $1.1 billion for a
three year period.
The 1970 Amendments were the result of consider-
able concern over the declining quality of the nation's air.
This growing concern over the effect of pollution on the
public health and welfare is exemplified in the findings of
Congress, stated at the beginning of the Act:
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Cl) That the predominant part of the Nation's
population is located in its rapidly expanding
metropolitan and other urban areas, which generally
cross the boundary lines of local jurisdictions
and often extend into two or more states;
(2) that the growth. in the amount and complexity of
air pollution brought about by urbanization,
industrial development, and the increasing use of
motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers
to the public health and welfare, including injury
to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and
the deterioration of property and hazards to air
and ground transportation;
(3) that the prevention and control of air pollution at
its source is the primary responsibility of states
and local governments; and
(4) that federal financial assistance and leadership
is essential for the development of cooperative
Federal, State, regional and local programs to pre-
vent and control air pollution.
The purpose of the Act was:
(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's
air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population;
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research
and development program to achieve the prevention
and control of air pollution;
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to
state and local governments in connection with
the development and execution of their air pollu-
tion prevention and control programs; and
(4) to encourage and assist the development and opera-
tion of regional air pollution control programs.
The 1970 Amendments provided for development and
enforcement of two kinds of standards for ambient air quality:
primary standards, necessary to protect the public health, and
secondary standards, necessary to protect the public welfare.
The goal of the Act was achievement of primary standards
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across the country by 19-7.
The amendments detailed a two-part strategy for
attaining the 1977 goal. The first part was on the federal
level and involved the newly formed Environmental Protection
Agency CEPA), which in December 1970 assumed control over the
air pollution control programs formerly administered by HEW.
EPA carried responsibility for establishing the air quality
standards for pollutants. The list, distributed by EPA in
November 1971, included six major classes of pollutants:
particulates, sulfur oxide CSO 2 ), hydrocarbons (HC), carbon
monoxide (CO), oxides of nitrogen (NO ), and photochemical
oxidants.
The second part of the strategy dealt with the
states. Each state would develop a State Implementation Plan
(SIP) indicating how it proposed to comply with the EPA stan-
dards. Each SIP was usually a compilation of state air
pollution statutes and regulations and of pollution control
strategies, including emission limitations, land use controls
and transportation controls. EPA would then either approve
the SIP, or amend it to conform with EPA standards for attain-
ing ambient air standards.
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (PL 95-95)
were signed into effect by President Carter on 7 August 1977.
The 1977 Amendments followed the basic tenets established in
the 1970 Amendments, focusing on a two-part strategy with air
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standards established on a national level and implementation
on a local level through the State Implementation Plans
(SIPs).
Added in the 1977 Amendments were new deadlines for
compliance with national standards, and stricter enforcement
policies. Under the new regulations, non-attainment areas
(areas where pollution levels currently exceed ambient air
standards), must have a revised and approved SIP by 1 July
1979, which provides for meeting primary air quality standards
by 31 December 1982. If a state cannot attain primary stan-
dards for carbon monoxide or photochemical oxides in a timely
fashion, despite implementation of all "reasonably available
pollution control measures", it must submit a second plan
revision by 31 December 1982 which provides for attainment
by 31 December 1987.
States with nondegredation areas (areas in which
the air is cleaner than required by national standards),
must include in their SIP a detailed plan to prevent any
significant deterioration of air quality.
The 1977 Amendments authorize EPA to seek civil
penalties of up to $25,000 a day for violations under the new
regulations. In addition, the regulations stipulate that:
No highway grants may be awarded unless reasonable
efforts are being made to include "non-attainment area"
requirements in implementation plans; no air pollution
control grants may be awarded unless approved plan re-
visions are being implemented, and in some cases EPA may
even withhold or restrict sewage treatment plant
construction grants.10
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ENVIRONMENTAL REORGANIZATION/MASSACHUSETTS
Federal environmental reorganization Cie, the for-
mation of EPA) coupled with. the requirements of the Clean Air
Act of 1970 prompted a renewed look at the Massachusetts
organizational structures responsible for pollution control.
In an attempt to more effectively comply with EPA regulations.,
all state environmental agencies in Massachusetts were re-
organized in July 1975, into the Executive Office of Environ-
mental Affairs (EOEA). There are 52 agencies and departments
in EOEA, making it the third largest state agency. EOEA is
under the direction of Secretary Evelyn Murphy, appointed in
December 1974 by then Governor-elect., Michael Dukakis.
EOEA determines and carries out state environmental
policies, in addition to planning programs to protect the
natural resources and to prevent and control pollution.
EOEA has the authority to issue rules and regulations re-
quired to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of
the agency.
EOEA is divided into five departments:
(1) Environmental Quality Engineering
(2) Environmental Management
(3) Metropolitan District Commission
(4) Food and Agriculture
(5) Fisheries, Wildlife and Recreational Vehicles.
Each department is headed by a Commissioner, appointed by
the Secretary.
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TABLE 2
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS (EOEA)
FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE
ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
ENGINEERING
ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT
METROPOLITAN
DISTRICT
COMMISSION
DIVISION OF AIR
AND HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS (DAHM)
FISHERIES,
WILDLIFE, AND
RECREATIONAL
VEHICLES
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENGINEERING (DEQE)
The Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
(DEQE) is one of five departments under the Executive Office
of Environmental Affairs (EOEA). DEQE has responsibility for
controlling air pollution and for regulating the state's
Ambient Air Quality Standards (AAQS).
DEQE receives its regulatory authority directly
from the Massachusetts General Laws which state that "the
Department of Environmental Engineering... may from time to
time, subject to the approval of the governor and council
after a hearing adopt or amend regulations to prevent pollu-
tion or contamination of the atmosphere..." 12
Following passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970,
Massachusetts developed an acceptable State Implementation
Plan and was working toward meeting its goals for ambient air
quality. In 1974 the Massachusetts Legislature amended the
General Laws imposing a restriction on state control of air
pollution in an effort to minimize the cost of attaining goals
for satisfactory abmient air quality. The amendments were
passed during the time of the oil embargo and the energy
crisis. Energy costs were skyrocketing, and the legislature
wanted to make it clear that they would not accept clean air
"at any cost necessary":
DEQE shall amend such standards and implementation
plan so as to minimize the economic cost of such stan-
dards and plan for implementation, provided, however,
that such standards shall not be less than the minimum
federal standards. The initial such amendments to such
standards and implementation plan shall postpone the
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achievement dates for the primarr and secondary ambient
air quality standards to the latest dates permitted
pursuant to federal law. 1 3
In essence, this provision places an important and
dual responsibility upon the department in that they must be
concerned not only with. air quality but with the economic
concerns involved in achieving that quality as well.
The Massachusetts General Laws also established
the Metropolitan Air Pollution Control District consisting
of:
... the territory and waters comprised within the cities
and towns of Arlington, Belmont, Boston, Braintree,
Brookline, Cambridge, Canton, Chelsea, Dedham, Everett,
Lynn, Malden, Medford, Melrose, Milton, Needham, Newton,
Peabody, Quincy, Revere, Saugus, Somerville, Stoneham,
Wakefield, Waltham, Watgtown, Weymouth, Winchester,
Winthrop, and Woburn...
The regulation of air pollution in the MAPCD is also
the responsibility of DEQE, with the same stipulations for
economic concern.
DIVISION OF AIR AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS (DAHM)
The Division of Air and Hazardous Materials (DAHM)
is the unit within DEQE directly responsible for the supervi-
sion and regulation of air quality standards in the MAPCD as
well as the rest of Massachusetts.
For the most part, the goals of DEQE/DAHM are
guided by federal and Massachusetts Laws. A 1977 Task Force
Report on DEQE/DAHM summarized the basic goals of the division
as follows:
(1) Attain and maintain the Massachusetts and National
Ambient Air Quality Standards designed to protect
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the public from any known or anticipated adverse
health. effects and control the emission of
hazardous materials into the atmosphere,
C2) Attain and maintain the Massachusetts and National
Second Ambient Air Quality Standards and prevent
and eliminate airborne nuisance conditions to avoid
interference with public comfort, safety or con-
venience or with the full use and enjoyment of
property.
(3) Enhance air quality to the extent possible consis-
tent with other goals and needs of the Commonwealth,
making certain that measures to implement the AAQS
are no more stringent and costly than necessary.1 5
The last goal of DAHM was added in 1977, primarily
in response to the legislature's amendments to Chapter 494 in
1974. It provides further evidence of the dual responsibility
of the division, that of clean air within economically reason-
able limits.
DAH RESPONSIBILITIES16
The general responsibilities of DAHM include devel-
oping department policies pertaining to all pollution noise
and pesticides control, and solid waste management; recom-
mending goals, priorities and objectives to the commissioner;
and overseeing and reviewing regional activities.
Organizationally, DAHM may be viewed as divided
into two sets of branches. Branch A units (on left side of
chart) are concerned primarily with direct monitoring of air
pollution control, while Branch B units (on right side of
chart) ostensibly focus more on the planning aspects of
pollution control. (See Table 3)
Overseeing the branch units are two Deputy directors,
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TABLE 3
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENGINEERING
Division of Air and Hazardous Materials
Office of Office
Training and of the
Program Planning Director
Deputy Director
for Technical
Services
(BRANCH A UNITS)
Deputy Director
for Planning &
Standards
(BRANCH B UNITS)
Air and Solid
Waste Sections,
Metro. Boston/
Northeast Region
Air and Solid
Waste Sections,
Central Region
Air and Solid Air and Solid
Waste Sections, Waste Sections,
Southeast Western Region
Region
C)
one for Technical Services (Branch A) and the other for Plan-
ning and Standards (Branch- B).
The Deputy Director for Technical Services provides
monitoring, engineering, data processing and various other
technical support to the Division as a whole as well as to
the air quality and solid waste sections of the Regional
Offices. The units under his jurisdiction and their respon-
sibilities include:
(a) Air Quality Surveillance Branch
o Develops policy on ambient air quality monitoring
o Designs and operates ambient air quality monitor-
ing network
o Designs and operates quality assurance program
o Validates ambient air quality data
Monitoring Section
o Designs and operates ambient air quality monitor-
ing network
o Performs special air quality studies
o Designs and operates quality assurance program
o Validates ambient air quality data
Data Analysis Section
o Analyzes ambient air quality data
o Prepares reports on the status of air quality
o Operates and reports the pollutant standards
index
Eb) Engineering Branch
o Develops policy on engineering plans review
o Provides training and technical assistance to
regional offices on engineering plans review,
air pollution control technology and noise
control.
(c) Systems Management Branch
o Provides data processing support to the Division
and Regional Offices
o Operates
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- Activity Management System
- Air Quality Data Handling System
- Enforcement Management System
- Emission Inventory System
- Performs air quality modeling under direction
of the Stationary Source Planning Branch
The Deputy Director for Planning and Standards is
responsible for developing plans for air quality improvements;
determining the consistency of transportation plans with
air quality implementation plans; developing air quality
and emission standards; producing Massachusetts Environ-
mental Protection Act (MEPA) reports; and developing policy
on pollutant source compliance and enforcement. His branch
units and their responsibilities include:
(a) Mobile Source Planning Branch
o Develops transportation control plans for Set
II pollutants
o Coordinates transportation plan consistency review
o Develops air quality maintenance plans for Set II
pollutants
(b) Stationary Source Planning Branch
o Develops attainment and maintenance plans for
Set I pollutants
o Develops and reviews Chapter 494 state implementa-
tion plan revisions
o Develops plans and policy for the prevention of
significant deterioration of air quality
o Coordinates the review of MEPA environmental
impact reports
o Directs air quality modeling activities
(c) Standards and Compliance Branch
o Develops ambient air quality and emission controls
o Develops policy on implementation of Chapter 494
state implementation plan revisions
o Develops policy on source compliance and enforce-
ment
o Coordinates enforcement referrals to the Attorney
General
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o Coordinates enforcenent activities with EPA
o Coordinates the status of source compliance with
regulations
o Coordinates input to the Compliance Data System
(d) Office of Training and Program Planning
o Coordinates and prepares the Division's annual
program plan and budget
o Develops systems and procedures to evaluate
program effectiveness and resource allocations
o Provides broad Division and Regional program
policy analysis including analysis of environ-
mental strategies, resource utilization and
program alternatives
o Develops a comprehensive training program for
the Division and Regional Air and Hazardous
Materials personnel
o Develops and coordinates a public education
program on air pollution, noise, pesticide
control, hazardous waste and solid waste
management
o Provides management analyses of Division and
Regional organization and functional assignment as
they relate to manpower utilization goals and
associated management improvement efforts.
During FY-1977, the program budget for DAHM was
$1,815,937.00. Of this total figure, $1.1 million was pro-
vided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The re-
maining $715,937.00 was provided by the Massachusetts General
Fund and by cities and towns in each air pollution control
district. The division's allocation was increased during
FY-1978 to $2,143,000 of which $1,200,000 was provided by
EPA.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
During 1977, in an effort "to obtain balanced
public input to their policy and rulemaking process", 1 7 the
department established a Technical and Policy Advisory Com-
mittee, whose purpose would be to help evaluate any programs
23
for pollution control considered by the department. The
committee includes representatives from private industry, the
public, the scientific community, other government agencies
and the Massachusetts legislature.
24
CHAPTER TWO
MODELS FOR DECISION-MAKING
Decision-making is a fundamental concern to virtually
every member of society, from a national as well as a personal
perspective. Each day decisions are made which relate to
domestic or foreign policy, and individuals themselves are
constantly faced with the situation of making choices of vary-
ing degrees of importance.
The manner in which governments plan, make decisions,
and carry out those decisions is a concept which has always
been of importance to planners, public policy-makers, systems
analysts and the like. In fact, there is often a direct link
between planning and public policy decision-making. Over time,
the concept of decision-making in the realm of public policy
has gained considerable importance as public interest and the
responsibility for protection of the public interest have come
more into focus.
Decision-making is a key component of the process
of air pollution regulation. It is most often the case in
this area that the decisions made have a direct link to and
effect upon the general health and welfare of the public.
What follows is a brief analysis of decision-making
and a general model for decision-making that will be employed
subsequently in the analysis of DEQE and its decision-making
process.
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Simply defined, decision-making is "the process
of selecting one action from a number of alternative
actions," i1 and a correct decision "one that is right for
the individual decider - based on his values, his goals, and
the risks he is willing to take regarding the alternatives." 2
Decisions, and the complexities involved in the process may
vary according to any number of influencing factors, but this
definition provides an initial framework for further discussion
on the issue.
The rational approach to decision-making is the
model which has dominated the field of decision-making for
more than fifty years. This domination is due in a large
part to the model's relationship with the concepts of reason
and science,characteristic of thought during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. The rational approach, also
termed the problem-solution approach, involves a series of
reflective thinking steps the main focus of which is object-
ivity. "The theory holds that if this process is applied
conscientiously, the solution will be determined not by man's
desires, but by the facts that are collected, because the
process moves inductively from the facts and then returns
deductively to the same facts."
According to John Dewey, writing in How We Think,
thinking, and subsequently decision-making, followed five
logically distinct steps: (1) a felt difficulty, (2) location
and definition of the difficulty, (3) suggestion of possible
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solution, (4) development by reasoning of the bearings of
the suggestion, (5) further observation and experiment
leading to its acceptance or rejection.4
In recent years, the basic problem-solution approach
has been applied in numerous fields under diverse conditions.
This has yielded modifications to the basic approach most of
which have centered around the emphasis on particular compo-
nents of the model.
Regulatory decision-making does not differ substan-
tially in definition from general decision-making. "Regula-
tory decision-making, defined in terms of its essential
activity means prior clearance of actions to be taken by the
relevant parties, review of the cleared actions concurrently
with their implementation, and review of those activities
after the fact in order to ascertain (and cope with) devia-
tions from that which was initially cleared." 5
Because of its dominance the rational approach is
the most sensible source for constructing a model against
which to assess the decision-making process employed by DEQE.
Equally important in this choice is the model's basic commit-
ment to objectivity, for it is objectivity combined with a
directed focus (i.e., regulation and control of state air
quality and protection of the public health) that is most
characteristic of the processes of DEQE.
It is worth noting that there exists no steadfast
"rule" for the components of a decision-making process of this
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nature. Just as decisions vary and cut across a wide spectrum,
the hypothetical and/or theoretical models used to make those
decisions may contain any number of varying components, based
on the issue at hand, the discipline involved and other
similar criteria.
It is important to recognize also that there exists
no set formula for a decision-making process. Often, depending
on the situation and circumstances at hand, a model/process
may deviate from its established chronology and may, at times,
loop around at any given point in the model to initiate the
process anew.
The model proposed herein is intended to provide
a starting point for an ideal decision-making process. Its
goal is to attempt to construct an inital framework; a compre-
hensive yet ostensibly objective model whose primary components
would most directly relate to a decision-making process
employed by DEQE.
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A MODEL FOR DECISION-MAKING
Making a choice between two or more alternatives
(i.e., a decision) is only one of several sequential steps
that should occur as part of an intellectual process, Th-ese
steps include:6
1. Identification of the problem.
2. Definition of the problem.
3. Data collection
4. Analysis of the problem.
5. Establish standards which any solution (decision)
deemed acceptable must meet.
6. Evaluation of possible solutions.
7. Selection of the solution.
8. Implementation of the solution.
9. Evaluation of the decision,
1. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
Often, the most difficult step in decision-making
is being aware that a decision needs to be made. Problem
identification deals simply with having an issue come into
focus and be acknowledged as a problem warranting a solution
(decision). The factors which may contribute to an issue
developing into a problem vary according to the individual
situations.
2. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
A crucial step in decision-making is the awareness
of the real problem that requires a decision. Once an issue
has been identified as a problem, it is necessary to clearly
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define what the problem is as well as those factors which-
contributed to the problem, Defining the real problem is not
always a simple task because what appears to be the problem
may only be a symptom. A simple but effective way of going
beyond symptoms and defining the problem is to ask "Why?".
Problem definition is linked with problem identification, and
the development of the two often occur simultaneously.
3. DATA COLLECTION
A key step in the decision-making process centers
on the collection of data. This step is important for two
reasons.
First, once a problem has been identified as requir-
ing a decision for solution, it is important to compile a
comprehensive set of information that will help the
decision-maker to 1) understand the possible causes of the
problem, 2) evaluate the problem in a more effective way, and
3) formulate a sound judgment based on a comprehensive set
of criteria and information.
Second, it is most often the case that the decision
will be strongly affected and influenced by the quantity
and more importantly, the quality of data collection.
Ostensibly however, the criteria used to determine
exactly what counts as credible or -relevant data should be
related first to the actual problem and second to the goals
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and objectives of the decision-maker, Linking the criteria
used for data collection to goals and objectives provides a
framework that will help the decision-maker more adequately
assess the utility of data collected, "If data is not care-
fully related-to goals and objectives, there is the real
danger that it will either fail to reflect certain important
issues ... or worse still, be almost irrelevant." 7
4. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
Problem analysis is a direct extension of data
collection, and involves analyzing available information.
It is often a question.of judgment as far as what information
is used as well as what information is available, but object-
ivity remains a key criteria in this phase of the process. In
problem analysis, any additional factors contributing to the
problem as well as the possible effects of the problem are
considered. Included in this analysis are 1) the conditions
or situation which indicated the existence of a problem,
2) the causes of the problem, 3) the effects or results of
the problem, 4) the predictions which seem probable concern-
ing the causes, and the possible symptoms, and the effects
of the problem in the future.
The quality of decisions is directly related to
the number of relevant facts which are gathered and analyzed
in reaching a decision.
5. ESTABLISH SOLUTION CRITERIA
Just as problems requiring solutions vary according
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to various factors, the criteria involved in determining the
decision change according to factors which relate to situa-
tion, actors, and so on. One of the requisites in formulat-
ing an effective decision is the establishment of minimum
criteria acceptable for a decision. Usually the criteria
will directly relate to the goals and objectives of the
decision-making party, but other individual factors should
also be taken into account.
6. EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The next step in the process involves searching for
and developing alternate courses of action. Solution
evaluation involves weighing possible decision alternatives
based on the data collected, the criteria established, other
influencing factors and the possible effects of the decision
in the future. The mechanism used to weigh a particular
decision is dependent upon the situation, the problem and the
decision-maker.
7. SELECTION OF THE SOLUTION
The whole purpose of making a decision is to select
the alternative which has the greatest number of positive
and least number of negative consequences. Three questions
can be used to guide this phase of the process: 1) Will the
decision contribute to the attainment of stated objectives?
2) Does the decision represent a high degree of economic
effectiveness? 3) Is the potential solution capable of
execution?
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8. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOLUTION
Once possible alternatives have been carefully
evaluated, the optimal solution is selected and implemented,
9. EVALUATION OF THE DECISION
Decision evaluation involves an assessment of the
applied decision, and may be done concurrently with the
decision as well as subsequently to the decision. The key
questions involved in an evaluation assessment include:
1) How well did the decision work, 2) Were the selection
standards/criteria adequate to address the problem, 3) What
were the results (anticipated or unanticipated) of the
decision?
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TABLE 4
A M O D E L ' F 0 R
mm.
D E C I S I O N - M A K I N G
PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION
PROBLEM
DEFINITION
SELECTION OF STANDARDS
FOR SOLUTION
*What are the minimum
standards for any decision
based on goals/objectives?
IMPLEMENTATION OF
SOLUTION
* Decision put into effect.
DATA
COLLECTION
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
*Indication of problem
existence.
*Cause of Problem.
*Immediate effects/results
of the problem..
*Future effects/results
of the problem.
EVALUATION OF SOLUTIONS
*Weighing alternatives/
consequences.
"- -I
SELECTION OF SOLUTION
*Adoption of a decision
based on selection
criteria.
EVALUATION OF DECISION
*How well did the decision
work?
*Were selection standard/
criteria adequate?
*Results(anticipated or un-
anticipated) of decision?
DECISION-MAKING MODEL/DEQE
The decision to be evaluated in this thesis relates
to MASCO's application for an Air Quality Plans Approval (Air
Quality Permit) for the proposed total energy plant. Presented
here is the process..for.approval as defined for DEQE by MEPA
and Massachusetts (DEQE) regulations.
The usual process for approval of a project such
as the one proposed by MASCO follows a clear series of steps.
These steps are outlined in Table 5:
TABLE 5
STEP ACTION
1 EIR submitted to DEQE
2 DEQE reviews EIR
3 DEQE submits EIR to EOEA
4 EIR reviewed by EOEA
5 EOEA accepts/rejects EIR
6 (Revision of EIR if necessary)
7 If revised, steps 1 - 5
8 Application for Air Quality Plans
approval submitted to DEQE
9 DEQE reviews application
10 DEQE issues proposed decision
11 30 day public comment period
12 Public hearing on proposed decision (optional)
13 DEQE issues final decision
According to regulations in effect at the time MATEP
was first proposed, the Environmental Impact Report (EIR)
was submitted to DEQE for initial review and then submitted to
EOEA by DEQE on behalf of the proposee. Since such time, the
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process has been amended so that the EIR i~s submitted
directly to EOEA by the proposer. CSteps 1-3)
The EIR is mandated by both Massachusetts and
National Environmental Protection Act CMEPA, NEPA) regulations,
which require governments to describe actions they are con-
templating which may result in harmful impacts on the environ-
ment. The EIR serves a.purely descriptive function, articu-
lating plans for a proposed project and defining what, if any,
the potential environmental impacts might be. Unlike the
Air Quality Permit, acceptance of an EIR by EOEA does not
consitute an official regulatory permission to proceed with a
project.
Once the EIR is submitted to EOEA, it is reviewed
and evaluated by that office and either accepted or rejected.
If rejected, the EIR is returned to DEQE and the proposers
for revision and resubmission. (Steps 4-7)
The next phase of the process involves the applica-
tion for Air Quality Plans Approval, which is submitted to
DEQE by the proposer. DEQE reviews the application for as
long as necessary, and when satisfied with the review, issues
a proposed decision. The posposed decision is followed by
a thirty-day comment period and an optional public hearing on
the proposed decision. The last step in the process is for
DEQE to issue a final decision, either approving or rejecting
the proposed project application. (Steps 8-13)
36
CHAPTER THREE
THE MATEP PROCESS
SYNOPSIS
The MATEP proposal has presented DEQE with a real
problem and provides a unique example of the range and com-
plexities of standards, consideration and criteria which- go
into making regulatory decisions consistent with the public
interest.
This chapter focuses first on the background and
sequence of events involved in the MATEP proposal, and in-
cludes the various actors and their individual modes of input
into the process and second, on the DEQE decision-making pro-
cess.
BACKGROUND
The Medical Area Total Energy Plant (MATEP) is a
project of Harvard University. MATEP has been almost fifteen
years in the making. The proposed plant would be built by
Harvard University, and operated by an already formed consor-
tium of area institutions known as the Medical Area Service
Corporation (MASCO) .
The primary purpose of the plant is to replace with
a total energy plant, the existing powerhouse on Blackfan
Street (See Appendix A). The Blackfan Street plant currently
provides steam and chilled water to Harvard and other affili-
ated schools and hospitals in the Mission Hill area.
The total energy plant would supply all the elec-
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tricity as well as all the steam heat and chilled water for
air conditioning to Harvard University, eleven affiliated
medical and teaching institutions, and an adjacent recently
completed housing development.
MATEP users would include Harvard University, the
New Affiliated Hospitals Center, Beth. Israel Hospital,
Children's Hospital Medical Center, New England Deaconess
Hospital, the Sidney Farber Cancer Center, the Joslin
Diabetes Foundation, the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy,
and the proposed MASCO Service Center. In addition, steam
will be provided to Simmons College, the Massachusetts Col-
lege of Art, and the Mission Park Housing Project, which,
unlike the MASCO institutions, would continue to purchase
electricity from Boston Edison.
PLANT DESCRIPTION
The most unique and controversial aspect of the
proposed plant is its capacity to provide electricity to the
area. At present, electric service is provided by the Boston
Edison Company. The plant would be located on a 1.7 acre
site bounded by Brookline Avenue, Peabody Street, Binney
Street and Francis Street (See Appendix A).
MATEP is the result of efforts to find an environ-
mentally and economically sound replacement or alternative
to the Blackfan Street powerhouse. The old plant, in opera-
tion since 1904 was determined by DEQE to be a real source
of pollution and in addition, was no longer adequate to meet
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the utility needs of the institutions it serviced.
MATEP has been planned and designed
to meet a wide range of energy demands electricity,
heat, cooling) as efficiently as possible.
It accomplishes this by recovering and using heat that would
normally be lost in conventional steam and electric plants.
For example, when the diesels are generating electricity,
they produce steam and hot water as a by-product; when the
boilers are generating steam, they can produce electricity
as a by-product.
The major equipment of the plant will consist of:
A. Six (6) 9600 hp diesel engines which will drive 6
generators for the production of electricity;
B. Two (2) heat recovery steam generators which will
operate on the exhaust gas from the diesel engines,
each producing 180,000 pounds of steam per hour;
C. Three (3) package steam generators with individual
maximum capacities of 180,000 pounds of steam per hour;
D. Three (3) electrostatic precipitators, one for each
package steam generator, used to control particulate
emissions from the steam generators;
E. One (1) steam turbine generator rated at 10,300 kw;
F. Two (2) steam turbine generators, each rated at
7,500/11,000 kw;
G. Two (2) 5,000 ton, motor driven centrifugal chillers;
H. Two (2) 5,000 ton centrifugal chillers with condens-
ing steam turbine drives;
I. One (1) 1,900 ton motor driven centrifugal chiller;
J. Six (6) cooling towers, each 140 feet high.
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Products of combustion will be emitted through a 315 foot
smoke stack (See Appendix B).
CHRONOLOGY
The decision process involving MASCO and the total
energy plant began on 30 April 1975 when Harvard (on behalf
of MASCO) filed a draft EIR with the EOEA, as mandated by
MEPA and NEPA regulations.
BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
Following Harvard's submission of the draft EIR,
Boston Edison submitted a commentary document disputing
many of Harvard's statements.
Boston Edison stated that Harvard had underestimated
their costs and overestimated their reliability, Harvard
in the Draft EIR, cited experience with their
current steam powerhouse as a basis for their expecta-
tions of the reliability of the new plant. However,
boiling water to make steam is a much simpler process
than generating electricity, steam, and chilled water
from diesel generators, steam turbines, and incinerator
waste heat. Boston Edison conjectured that the reli-
ability would not only be less than Harvard anticipated,
but also far less than Boston Edison could provide.
Alternatives which (according to Boston Edison) should
have been given more consideration were: Harvard pro-
ducing its own steam and buying electricity from Boston
Edison; buying both steam and electricity from Boston
Edison; and joining Boston Edison in a joint venture for
the steam plant and buying electricity from Boston
Edison. The environmental advantage of all of these
alternatives is that the electricity can be produced
in less sensitive environmental areas with fuels other
than high grade oil.
On 1 July 1975, Harvard filed an application with
the Boston Redevelopment Agency (BRA) for designation of MATEP
as a Chapter 121A redevelopment project. The 121A permit, if
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approved, would enable Harvard to construct the plant with a
special negotiated tax status, in addition to exempting the
institution from all city ordinances. That same month, the
BRA held hearings on the environmental impact of the plant.
On 26 August 1975, the BRA held a public hearing
on Harvard's application for the 121A permit. In attendance
at this hearing and the previous one held in July were repre-
sentatives from the Mission Hill community and from the
Boston Edison Company, who voiced considerable opposition to
the plant for environmental and economic reasons.
MISSION HILL
Mission Hill is a low-income community located
adjacent to the proposed energy plant (See Appendix A).
At the turn of the century, Mission Hill was a close knit
Irish Catholic community. Over the years, the neighborhood
experienced a transition as students, blacks and Spanish
people moved in. The income level of the community declined,
the strength of the church deteriorated, and the educational
and health-related institutions took over more and more of
the land.
Politically, residents of Mission Hill have long
resented the intrusion and continual expansion of Harvard
and the other medical and educational institutions into their
community, and there exists a tradition of the community
battling the medical establishment.
When plans for the energy plant were first announced,
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residents banded together in several different groups to fight
approval and construction of the plant. The most active
community group was RUSH (Residents United to Stop Harvard).
The other principal community group was the Roxbury
Tenants of Harvard (RTH). RTR was created in 1969 and since
such time has been an active community organization. They
have succeeded in eliciting from Harvard a commitment to
replace homes demolished by Harvard's expansion, and were a
principal proponent in the formation of the Mission Hill
Medical Committee which.succeeded in placing community resi-
dents on the boards of the local hospitals.
Together, RUSH and RTH formed a strong vocal con-
tingent in opposition to MATEP. At the BRA hearing in July,
both groups asserted opposition to the plant for environ-
mental reasons:
The people who've opposed the plant for the longest
time, who first saw it as something that was unaccept-
able from a community standpoint, have been opposed
and continue to he opposed basically from a land use
planning point of view. The fact that you would take a
site, approximately an acre and a half, locate it in
one of the most densely populated areas in the middle
of the metropolitan area and denote that for use for
an (emphasis added) large industrial facility, let
one one that would call for the burning of large
amounts of fossil fuel, just seems utterly preposterous..
.. totally unthinkable.2
Following the July 1975 hearing, Harvard stated
that without the free steam that the power plant would pro-
vide, the proposed housing project would be economically
infeasible. As a result, RTH was forced not only "to accept
the power plant in order to guarantee completion of Mission
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Park, but had to publicly support it#' To ensure that they
would Csupport the plant), Harvard refused to begin construc-
tion of the housing until the plant had received its 121A
approval from the BRA,"3
Consequently, RTHRmade a large showing in favor of
the plant at the August BRA hearing.
During August 1975, Secretary Evelyn Murphy (EOEA)
rejected the draft EIR since it was not in compliance with
regulations for the preparation of such a report. She
returned the document to Harvard for revision.
On 29 September 1975, Harvard submitted a final
EIR for EOEA review. Less than a month later, on 7 October
1975, thirteen members of RUSH signed a notice of intent to
file suit against the BRA and the pending 121A permit
for "violation of G.L. c.30§§61 and 62, Massachusetts Environ-
mental Protection Act." 4  The notice was initiated by
Boston Edison, but a suit was never filed. Allegedly,
Boston Edison dropped the suit because it would not be in
their own self interest to point out all the environmental
problems associated with siting power plants in cities. 5
In particular, in the event that the Harvard plant was denied
approval, Boston Edison had plans to build a steam plant on
Station Street approximately 3/4 of a mile from Harvard's
proposed plant (see Appendix A),
Two days later, on 9 October 1975, the BRA approved
the proposed plant as a 121A project.
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Subsequent to the BRA decision, Boston Edison
actually filed suit, charging that Harvard had been given an
unfair competitive advantage in the selling of electricity
and steam, and that Harvard had committed "premeditated
blight" to gain the 121A permit. C"Premeditated blight"
refers to the process Harvard allegedly used with respect
to the proposed site. Harvard acquired the block of the pro-
posed site, planned it for the power plant, and proceeded
to do no maintenance on the buildings. In effect, they
bought the property for speculation, allowed it to become
run-down and subsequently went to the BRA for a 121A permit
on the grounds that the area was blighted. 6 )
Specifically, Boston Edison contended that:
1) Under G.L. c 121B §§5 and 6, four members of the BRA
were "holdovers" and were not valid office holders
at the time the project was approved;
2) the 121A application did not state the amount to be
paid in lieu of taxes in violation of G.L. c 121A
§§6A;
3) the Environmental Impact Report was inadequate at
the time the project received approval in violation
of G.L. c 30;
4) the project was not a "project" as defined by G.L.
c 121A;
5) the BRA erred in determining that the area was
decadent and substandard;
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6) the BRA erred in approving a project which conflicted
with the General Plan for the City of Boston, the
Fenway Urban Renewal Plan and the Boston Zoning Code;
7) the BRA erred in approving a project which injured
an unsubsidized public utility which operated in the
public interest.7
The case was not decided until 4 August 1976, when
Associated Justice, John J. McNaught delivered his opinion
and decided against Boston Edison on every point.8
The EIR was rejected for a second time by Secretary
Murphy on 5 November 1975. Secretary Murphy issued a state-
ment indicating that in her judgment the Final Report "as
submitted does not provide in sufficient form and detail in-
formation on critical assumptions and projections to permit
reasoned judgments as to the potential impacts of the proposed
project and its alternatives," and requested additional infor-
mation which would "permit the report to be considered adequate." 9
On 15 December 1975, Harvard submitted a supplement
to the final EIR. On 23 January 1976, Secretary Murphy
issued a statement approving the final EIR:
I have reviewed (the) information, and have received
comments on it from interested members of the public.
It is my judgment that the Authority and the Depart-
ment have now adequately and properly complied with
the requirements of G.L. ch. 30, s. 62, with respect
to the proposed project and I so state. This state-
ment is intended to supersede my statement of November
5, 1975.10
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MATEP AND DEQE
In February 1976, Harvard submitted to
DEQE an application for Air Quality Plans Approval (Air
Quality Permit). The Air Quality Permit represents the
state authorization for construction of the proposed plant.
Subsequent to this initial application, DEQE, cognizant
that the application as presented would not be approved,
suggested that Harvard withdraw their application and resub-
mit another. It is at this point that the DEQE decision pro-
cess begins. This action on the part of DEQE was not an
official part of the established process and to better
understand their motivation for this and subsequent actions,
a brief explanation of the political climate is necessary.
Prior to Harvard's decision to construct MATEP,
DEQE had established that the existing power plant on
Blackfan Street was a major source of pollution and that
the plant would have to be shut down. The alternative
that Harvard proposed was MATEP, a total energy plant that
ostensibly would be both economically and environmentally
reasonable. The administration of DEQE at the time, speci-
fically Commissioner David Standley and the Director of
the Division of Air Quality Control (later changed to the
Division of Air and Hazardous Materials), Gilbert Joly,
felt that the alternative was feasible and became committed
to the construction of MATEP. DEQE was convinced early on
that the proposed plant would be okay and at this point they
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had little doubt that the plant would he approved and con-.
structed.
What this opinion meant was that DEQE became a
sort of ally of Harvard, committed to doing all they could to
ensure the plant's approval. Hence the decision to allow Harvard to
withdraw, then resubmit their Air Quality Permit application.
The other key political factor was that since the
time of their initial application in February 1976, Harvard
had continually stressed to DEQE the need for speedy review
of the application so that they could begin excavation and
construction. A key element in this approach was Harvard's
knowledge of the growing community opposition to the plant
coupled with their knowledge of how strong and effective the
community might be in arresting the plant's construction,
given ample time and opportunity.
On 23 March 1976, Division Director Gilbert Joly
wrote Harvard to inform them that as proposed, MATEP would
violate the particulate emission standards.11 To meet air
quality standards, MATEP would require high efficiency
electrostatic precipitators. This equipment necessitated
a stronger foundation and consequently new designs for the
plant. At that time, Harvard was without an engineering firm
since they had fired their previous contractors.
Although at this point Harvard had not yet sub-
mitted a second Air Quality Permit application, they
were nonetheless very anxious to get started on the project.
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This concern seems to have been shared by DEQE, In a letter
dated 20 April 1976, Commissioner David Standley made the
following interpretation of the rules and regulations
governing the permit application:
As defined in regulation 3, 'No person shall construct,
substantially reconstruct, or alter any facility regu-
lated herein.. .unless the plans, specifications, pro-
posed Standard Operating Procedure and the Proposed
Maintenance Operating Procedure for such facility have
been submitted to the Department for approval and appro-
val has been granted in writing'. The regulations de-
fine the content of each application in detail(2.1.1(c)
and (d) and indicate that approval cannot be granted if
the facility would exceed the applicable regulatory emis-
sion limitations (2.1.2).
For the vast majority of applications before the Depart-
ment this language is self-evident; for the most part,
an application is not considered until all of the in-
formation requirements are met. Additionally, the
Department has traditionally interpreted (and Federal
regulations defined), 'construction' to mean all phases
of project construction, including excavation.
Based upon this reading, it is not possible for the
Department to allow MATEP to commence excavation without
plan approval by the Department. However, I believe
a certain degree of flexibility is provided the Depart-
ment with regard to the nature of plan approval. In
the case of MATEP, or any other facility which has unique
construction scheduling considerations, excavation could
be allowed on the basis of approving preliminary plans
and specifications, a submission involving less detail
than final plans and specifications, but constituting
a firm commitment to a specific course of action and
final design.
This interpretation formed the basis of a subse-
quent DEQE decision to allow Harvard to begin excavation of
the proposed site.
24 September 1976 stands on record as the date of
Harvard's submission of the Air Quality Permit application.
On 5 November 1976, Harvard submitted a supplement to the
48
application based on earlier DEQE correspondence concerning
the particulate emission standards.
Less than one month after DEQE received Harvard's
Air Quality Permit application, DEQE Commissioner David
Standley granted Harvard permission to begin excavation of
the proposed site although the application had not yet been
approved. In effect, the power plant was viewed as an
"exception" to normal standards. The decision to allow
excavation was based, in part, on the fact that Harvard's
application appeared as though it would be accepted.13
This decision represented a further digression from usual
procedures on the part of DEQE and is representative of the
department's commitment to the MATEP project.
DEPARTMENTAL CHANGES/DEQE
During December 1976, DEQE experienced a change in
administration. Division Director Gilbert Joly left the
department and was replaced by Dr. Anthony Cortese. This
change in Directors was significant because it subsequently
warranted a change in DEQE's perception of the MATEP project
and the issues involved in its approval.
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Dr. Cortese, unlike most of the DEQE administration,
came with a background in public health as well as engineering.
This background made him extremely cognizant of public health
concerns.
The political climate under which the new director
assumed his responsibilities was not drastically altered by
his arrival. Dr. Cortese remained committed to the objective
of shutting down the old plant primarily because of the extreme
health and pollution hazard the plant posed. He also retained
a basic agreement with the design of the new plant, and the
Department's subjective policy of helping Harvard submit an
approvable plan. The significant change that Dr. Cortese
prompted was a more careful look at the health concerns that
MATEP posed to the community in which it was to be located.
Most of the major environmental issues had been raised and
dismissed during the BRA's involvement with MATEP (121A appli-
cation). However, under Dr. Cortese's influence, DEQE began
to examine in more detail the potential health effects of
MATEP.
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BROOKLINE
The Town of Brookline entered the MATEP controversy
late in 1976 when the potential effects of the plant on the
community began to be apparent. Brookline's high proportion
of elderly person made it especially concerned with negative
air pollution effects.
In January 1977, the Town's Board of Selectmen
appointed a special Ad Hoc Citizen's Committee to investigate
the particulars involved in the issue and to speak for the
town. The committee emphasized that it was working as a
citizen's body in the interest of the town and not as part of
any anti-Harvard coalition.
On 5 August 1977, the committee.issued a report
which stated that as designed, the proposed plant presented
an unacceptable hazard to the Town of Brookline:
In reviewing the MATEP project, the Committee was aware
of the desire of Harvard and of MASCO to become self-
sufficient in the production of steam, chilled water and
electricity. The Committee was also aware that any plant
of this nature built in close proximity to Brookline
would impose upon Brookline, and upon other neighboring
communities, health and environmental costs in the form
of increased air pollution. Having nothing to gain and
everything to lose, the question for the Town is whether
the health and environmental costs are acceptable to
the Town in the light of the benefits anticipated for
Harvard and MASCO. The Committee's conclusion, reached
after many hours of study and of consultation with
proponents, opponents and experts, is that the environ-
mental costs of the project are disproportionatly high
and constitute and unacceptable hazard to the Town of
Brookline.14
The Committee further recommended the following
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actions for the Board of Selectmen to protect the public
interest:
First, in view of the air pollution caused by the
proposed production of electricity, that the Board
of Selectmen petition the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering to register opposition
to the project as presently designed and to request per-
mission to intervene in the proceedings on the Harvard/
MASCO Application for Air Quality Plans Approval.
Second, that the Board of Selectmen request the Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality Engineering to require
that the production of electricity be eliminated from
the project, allowing only the production of steam and
of chilled water. Third, if, notwithstanding the Town's
opposition to the production of electricity in the pre-
sent design, Air Quality Plans Approval is granted for
the project, that the Board of Selectmen take such
action as ma-v be appropriate to prevent construction of
the project.15
The Board of Selectmen adopted recommendations one
and two on 8 August 1977, with action on recommendation three
pending the outcome of the Air Quality Permit review by DEQE.
Harvard responded to the Committee's 7 August report
with a critique which argued that:
(A) MATEP will actually emit fewer particulates, both
total and respirable, than the existing plant;
(B) that reliance on the availability of low-sulfur oil
is adequate as a technique for the control of sulfur
dioxide emissions; and
(C) that the proposed plant's nitrogen emissions will not
violate existing air quality standards.16
Subsequent to the Harvard critique, the Committee
issued another report, 7 October 1977, responding in detail
to the three propositions with a point-by-point refutation of
17
the statements made in the Harvard critique.
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In October 1977, after 10 montht s deliberation on
the MATEP proposal, DEQE was prepared to issue a "proposed
decision" against MATEP due to concerns around the nitrogen
dioxide that the diesel engine portion of the plant would
produce. The decision is called "proposed", because a
thirty day comment period and an optional public hearing is
required before a final decision is issued.
Between the time of this decision and the time of
DEQE's announcement of a proposed decision (November 1976 -
October 1977), Harvard was continually in the process of
redesigning and modifying their original plans based on a
series of major issues that the department was consistently
encountering with respect to their application. The most
significant of these issues centered around the NO2 emissions
from the diesel engine portion of the proposed plant. During
July and August of 1977 DEQE had initiated an in-depth look
at the NO2 emissions and the current standards for accept-
able NO2 levels. This investigation prompted DEQE to recon-
sider the MATEP application, especially as it applied to the
NO2 emissions from the diesel engines.
Harvard's final amendment to the application was
received by the department on 26 October 1977, only two days
prior to DEQE's announcement of a proposed decision.
On 28 October 1977, DEQE announced a proposed
decision in favor of the power plant. This action was signi-
ficant for two reasons. First, because the announcement had
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been postponed on three previous occasions, during which- time
Harvard had a chance to amend its proposal, Second, the
action represented a reversal on the part of the department
which prior to Harvard's 26 October 1977 amendments, had
been prepared to issue a proposed decision against the plant.
On 29 November 1977, one day before the scheduled public
informational hearing, the department announced its decision
to bifurcate the final decision related to the plant.
What it came down to.. .the issue was, whether or not
the department could issue a decision on a portion of
the facility while still considering a different por-
tion. The department's feeling was that indeed at the
end of the process it could approve or disapprove any
portion of the whole facility, and if that could happen
at the end, why couldn't it happen in pieces?18
A department spokesperson further explained the rationale for
bifurcation;
Because of the nature of this facility, it was rather
an obvious thing to do, because they really are two
different pieces of the facility. They're connected,
but not totally connected. You can separate the two
issues apart, both from an air quality point of view and
from the engineering point of view. They (Harvard)
could operate, so they said, a plant that is just steam
and chilled water.19
As a result of the decision to bifurcate, the
30 November hearing dealt only with the steam and chilled
water portion of the proposed plant, leaving the more contro-
versial diesel engine portion for a subsequent hearing
scheduled for 19 December 1977.
This sparked a great deal of controversy among the
people present at the hearing. Members of RUSH staged a
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massive walkout following the announcement, accusing DEQE
of biased behavior favoring Harvard, and of attempting to
split the opposition.
Bifurcation was simply a means of easing into
full approval, of fragmenting important issues
into meaningless parts. You break up the project
into enough little pieces, and you won't see
their effects. 20
On 20 December 1977, the Department approved the
steam/chilled water portion of the plant subject to a number
of provisions.
The final decision in the MATEP process occurred
on 31 January 1978 when DEQE issued a decision against the
diesel engine portion of the plant. The major issue involved
in the decision concerned the level of NO2 that would be
adequate to protect the health of all segments of the popula-
tion. In its memorandum on the final decision, the Department
stated:
...the construction (installation) and operation
of the MATEP diesels will lead to NO 2 levels, which
on the basis of current information, are potentially
injurious to human life and/or would unreasonably
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life.
Therefore, pursuant to Regulation 1.1 and 2.1.2 of
the "Regulations for the Control of Air Pollution
in the Metropolitan Boston Air Pollution Control
District", it is recommended that the diesel portion
of the MATEP facility be disapproved.
This recommendation is a departure from the Department's
proposed decision on the diesel portion of MATEP.
Comments received at the public hearing have led
to a reanalysis of background NO2 levels and plant
impact; however, this has resulted in a very small
55
change in estimated levels due to MATEP plus
background. The reason for recommending dis-
approval is the finding that a one hour level
of 200 ug/M 3 should not be exceeded if the health
of persons in the area affected by MATEP is to
be protected. In reaching this conclusion, the
Department has relied heavily on the testimony
of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.21
PUBLIC HEARINGS
The Department held two sets of public hearings on
the MATEP application, the first during November 1977, and the
second during December 1977.
Originally, DEQE had planned to hold only one hear-
ing on its proposed decision, scheduled for 30 November 1977.
When the Department decided to bifurcate the final decision,
it became necessary to schedule a subsequent hearing for
19 December 1977.
30 NOVEMBER 1977
Prior to the start of the 30 November hearing,
members of RUSH distributed songsheets and led the audience
in singing "Songs to Seranade Harvard By", a group of carols
with revised lyrics which attacked Harvard and the proposed
plant. (See Appendix D)
At the beginning of the hearing, the Department
announced its decision to bifurcate. "The reason given by
the DEA (DEQE) for splitting the hearing was to allow opponents
time to study and react to information recently received from
the Federal Environmental Protection Agency on control tech-
nology and the level of nitrogen oxides in the area."22
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DEQE representative, Thomas McLaughlin chaired
the hearing and stated that "the continuance was the Depart-
ment's attempt to accomodate people who want to give technical
testimony on the diesels." 23
The Department's decision was met with considerable
opposition by opponents present at the hearing. For almost
an hour, opponents argued with DEQE representatives on the
hearing procedures, accusing DEQE of biased behavior in handling
the MATEP application. Members of the Mission Hill community
asserted that by scheduling the second hearing only six days
before Christmas, the Department would be preventing opponents
with familial obligations the opportunity to present testimony.2 4
Finally, members of RUSH, apparently fed up with the
sequence of events, walked out of the hearing en masse in
protest.
The remainder of the hearing which eventually took
an additional evening, was devoted "to presentation on the
proposed plant by representatives of MASCO, to questions on
that presentation by opponents, and to opponents' refuting
Harvard's information." 25
19 DECEMBER 1977
The second hearing on the MATEP proposal dealt
specifically with the diesel engine portion of the proposed
plant. Testimony both for and against the plant centered
around the nitrogen oxide emissions from the diesel engines.
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James A. Ferner, Project Manager for United Engineers
and Const ctors Iac. (MATEP construction firm), presented
testimony and slides which attempted to "demonstrate that
the DEQE limit (NO2 ) will not be exceeded and that the WHO
limit of 320 will be exceeded rarely, if ever, as a result
of MATEP .26
Testimony from Dr. David Kinloch, Deputy Commissioner
of the Department of Public Health, asserted that the current
standard and safety factor for NO2 was not sufficient to pro-
tect the public health:
After reviewing the literature concerning health
effects of NO2 , we have concluded that the maximum
one-hour exposure guidelines of 480 ug/M3 currently
being considered by DEQE is not adequate to protect
the public health...we cannot accept a safety factor
of 2.0 as adequate...the safety factor should be at
least 5.27
Dr. John Hermos, Chairman of the Brookline Citizens
to Protect the Environment, also testified on the harmful
effects of the NO2 emissions, and voiced that group's opposition
to the proposed plant:
The Brookline Citizens to Protect the Environment is
a group of Brookline residents opposed to the MATEP
plant as proposed because of the serious harmful
effects it will have on the health and environment
of the people of Brookline and other communities
nearby... this plant should not be located in a
heavily populated area, particularly in an area which
includes many elderly, young and sick people who are
especially sensitive to the harmful pollutants which
this plant will emit...Particularly harmful to the
health of the residents of the area will be large
amounts of nitrogen dioxide which the diesels will
create--10 times the amount of NO2 caused by the
Blackfan steam plant now being operated by Harvard... 28(We urge the Department to disapprove the MATEP application.
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TABLE 6
DATE'
30 April
April
29 September
5 November
15 December
23 January
February
February
23 March
20 April
24 September
5 November
16 November
December
November
October
July,
August
October
October
ACTION
1975 Draft EIR filed with EOEA
1975 EOEA rejects Draft EIR
1975
1975
1975
Final EIR submitted to EOEA
EOEA rejects final EIR
Supplement to final EIR submitted
1976 EOEA accepts final EIR
1976
1976
Harvard (unofficially) submits applica-
tion for Air Quality Plans approval
DEQE (unofficially) suggests withdrawal
of application
1976 DEQE letter to Harvard re: particulates
1976 DEQE (Standley) letter to Harvard re:
excavation
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976-
1977
Harvard submits application for Air
Quality Plans Approval
Harvard submits supplement to Air
Quality application
DEQE (Standley) gives Harvard permis-
sion to begin excavation of site
Anthony Cortese replaces Gilbert Joly
as Director of DAHM
DEQE deliberation on ;MATEP proposal
1977 DEQE begins intensive research on NO2
emissions
1977 DEQE prepared to issue a proposed
decision against the plant
1977 DEQE postpones decision three times
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DATE ACTION
October
28 October
28
30
October-
November
29 November
30 November-
1 December
19-20 December
20 December
20 December
31 January
31 January
19-77 Harvard. reviews proposed decision and
amends its proposal
1977 DEQE announces proposed decision in
favor of MATEP
1977
1977
1977
30 day public comment period on
proposed decision
DEQE decides to hifurcate the final
decision
Public hearing on Part I of final
decision (steam and chilled water)
1977 Public hearing on Part II of final
decision (diesel engines)
1977 DEQE issues final decision in favor of
the steam and chilled water portion of
the plant
1977-
1978 DEQE deliberation on Part II (diesel
engine) portion of decision
1978 DEQE issues final decision against the
diesel engine portion of the plant
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TABLE 7
M A T E P C H R 0 N 0 L 0 G Y
Mission H111 Mission Hill BOSTON
DATE MASCO DEQE BRA EOEA (RUSH) RTH EDISON BROOKLINE
30 APRIL 1975 DRAFT EIR SUB-MITTED TO EOEA
REJECTS
DRAFT EIR
COMMENTS ONMAY 1975 MATEP EIR
PUBLIC HEAR- BRA HEARING BRA HEARING BRA HEARING
JULY 1975 121A ON ENVIRONMENT- OPPOSITION OPPOSITION OPPOSITION
APPLICATION AL IMPACT OF
MATEP
THREATENS RTH WITHDRAWS
W/FAILURE TO OPPOSITION
COMPLETE MIS- TO MATEP
SION PARK
121A PUBLIC BRA HEARING BRA HEARING BRA HEARING26 AUGUST 1975 HEARING OPPOSITION FAVORABLE OPPOSITION
29 SEPTEMBER 1975 SUBMITS FINAL29 SPTEBER 975EIR TO EOEA ____________ _______
7 OCTOBER 1975 13 MEMBERS INITIATESSIGN NOTICE NOTICE OF
OF INTENT TO INTENT TO
FILE SUIT FILE SUIT
AGAINST BRA AGAINST BRA
9 OCTOBER 1975 ISSUES
APPROVAL FOR
MATEP AS 121A
PROJECT
INTERVENING FILES SUITOCTOBER- PLAINTIFFS FOR AGAINST BRANOVEMBER 1975 BOSTON EDISON
SUIT
BER 1975 REJECTS CONTINUEDFINAL EIR OPPOSITION:
15 DECEMBER 1975 SUBMITS SUP-
PLEMENT TO
FINAL EIR TO
E( A
WRITTEN,
VERBAL,
V"IBLE
v-4
DATE MASCO DEQE BRA EOEA
Mission Hill
(RHSH)
Mission Hill
RTH
BOSTON
EDISO~N BROOKL1INE
23 JANUARY 1976 ACCEPTS
__________________ _________________FINAL EIR __ 
_____ ____ 
____
FEBRUARY 1976 UNOF IAL
AIR QUALITY
PERMIT
APPLICATION
____ ~~TO DEQE________________ 
____ _____ 
______ 
____ _____
SUGGESTS
WITHDRAWAL OF
MATEP
APPLICATION
23 MARCH 1976 LETTER TO
MASCO RE:
PARTICULATES
20 APRIL 1976 LETTER RE:
EXCAVATION
24 SEPTEMBER 1976 RESUBMITS
AIR QUALITY
PERMIT
APPLICATION
TO DEQE
5 NOVEMBER 1976 SUPPLEMENT
TO APPLICA-
TION SUB-
MITTED TO
16 NOVEMBER 1976 -MASCO GIVEN TOWN INTEREST
PERMISSION ON EFFECTS
TO EXCAVATE OF PLANT
SITE
DECEMBER 1976 GILBERT JOLY AD HOC
REPLACED BY COMMITTEE
ANTHONY APPOINTED
CORTESE AS
DIVISION
DIRECTOR
'.0
DATE MASCO DEQE BRA EOEA
Mission Hill
(R USH)
Mission Hill
RTH
BOSTON
EDISON BROOKLINE
NOVEMBER 1976- DELIBERATION
OCTOBER 1977 ON ATEPOCTOBER 1977 ~PROPOSAL____ ___________ 
__ __________
JULY, INTENSIVE
AUGUST 1977 RESEARCH ON
N02 ISSUE
BEGINS
AUGUST 1977 AD M OCCOMMITTEE
REPORT/BOARD OF
SEPTEMBER 1977 CRITIQUE NO2  SELECTfEN APP6ROF AD HOC RESEARCH VAL
COMMITTEE
REPORT
7 OCTOBER 1977 NO2  REFUTATIONRESEARCH OF HARVARD'S
CRITIQUE
OCTOBER 1977 DEQE PRE-PARED TO ISSUE
PROPOSED
DECISION
AGAINST PLANT
DECISION
POSTPONED
THREE TIMES
HARVARD NO2REVIEWS & RESEARCH
AMENDS
PROPOSAL
28 OCTOBER 1977 DEISNIN
FAVOR OF
MATEP
28 OCTOBER- 30 DAY PUBLIC
30 NOVEMBER 1977 COMMENT PERIOD
ON PROPOSED
DECISION
DATE MASCO DEQE BRA EOEA
Mission Hill
(RUSH)
Mission Hill
RTH
BOSTON
ED)ISON ROOKINE
29 NOVEMBER 1977 BIFURCATION
30 NOVEMBER- DEFENSE PUBLIC VOCAL OPPOSITION TO
1 DECEMBER 1977 OF HEARING ON OPPOSITION TO MATEP, STATE-
MATEP PART I OF HEARING: WALK- MENT AT
FINAL OUT HEARING
DECISION
19-20 DECEMBER 1977 DEFENSE PUBLIC HEAR- OPPOSITION TO OPPOSITION TO
OF ING, PART II MATEP, STATE- MATEP, STATE-
MATEP (DIESELS) MENT AT HEAR- MENT AT HEAR-
ING ING
20 DECEMBER 1977 FINAL DECI- INCREASED INCREASEDSION IN FAVOR OPPOSITION OPPOSITION
OF STEAM/
CHILLED WATER
20 DECEMBER 1977- DELIBERATION CONTINUED CONTINUED
31 JANUARY 1978 ON DIESEL OPPOSITION OPPOSITION
ENGINE PORTION
OF PLANT
31 JANUARY 1978 DE ION
AGAINST DIESEL
ENGINE PORTION
OF PLANT
CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF DEQE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the
decision-making process used by the Department of Environ-
mental Quality Engineering (DEQE) will focus on three pri-
mary areas:
(1) the process compared with the stated goals of
the agency (internal consistency)
(2) outside perceptions of the process (external
sufficiency)
(3) comparison of the DEQE process with the models
formulated in Chapter Two (theoretical adequacy)
AGENCY GOALS VS. PROCESS/INTERNAL CONSISTENCY
As stated in Section I, DEQE's goals are to:
(1) Attain and maintain the Massachusetts and
National Ambient Air Quality Standards designed
to protect the public from any known or antici-
pated adverse health effects and control the
emission of hazardous materials into the atmo-
sphere.
(2) Attain and maintain the Massachusetts and
National Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards
and prevent and eliminate airborne nuisance
conditions to avoid interference with public
comfort, safety, or convenience or with the full
use and enjoyment of property.
(3) Enhance air quality to the extent possible
consistent with other goals and needs of the
Commonwealth, making certain that measures to
implement the AAQS are no more stringent and
costly than necessary.
65
The key element in the aforementioned goals is the
need to protect the public and the public health. However,
the entire DEQE decision-making process was not entirely
reflective of this objective. Often throughout the process
the goals of the agency appear to have been overlooked or
misplaced.
The earliest evidence of any commitment toward the
public health is the DEQE decision to close the Blackfan
Street plant because it was a pollution hazard. In fact,
this decision may have been based more on technical stan-
dards than on any real concern for the public health.
From the time of the initial MATEP application for
an Air Quality Permit up until Dr. Anthony Cortese replaced
Gilbert Joly as Director of DAHM, there is no real evidence
of the Department attempting to achieve its stated goals
with respect to the MATEP proposal.
Instead, what becomes evident is a sort of agency/
proposer alliance toward an ostensibly credible goal, but a
goal rooted more in technicity than in the public health.
This judgment is based, in part, on the orientation
of DEQE as a regulatory agency. While the espoused goals
of the agency reflect a concern for the public health, the
actions of the department are rooted more in technical and
engineering standards, and for the most part there does not
exist a compatible mix of the two elements.2
With the arrival of Dr. Cortese as Director of
66.
DAHM, the Departmentwhether willingly or unwillingly, began
to become more concerned about the issue of public health.
From the evidence presented, it appears that this change in
Department attitude and perception was due largely to Dr.
Cortese's input into the decision process.
Unlike most of the personnel in the Department,
Dr. Cortese has a background in public health over and above
standard training in engineering. This experience appears to
have made him more cognizant of and receptive to the sorely
needed mix between engineering/technical standards and concern
for the public health.
Subsequent to Dr. Cortese assuming responsibility as
Director, the decision process for DEQE began to be somewhat
more reflective of its espoused goals.
Undoubtedly the change was far from great, as
evidenced by the continued community opposition to the process.
In addition, the objectives of the process had already been
clouded by previous Department actions related to MATEP, such
as the approval for excavation pending approval of the Air
Quality Permit.
Nevertheless, toward the end of the process, the
Department did show some evidence of attempting to achieve
agency goals in the MATEP decision. This became most
evident with respect to the issue of the nitrogen dioxide
emissions from the diesel engine portion of the plant. In
evaluating and subsequently deciding on this issue, the
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Department went beyond the ninimum standards of their goals
and challenged not only the Massachusetts Ambient Air Quality
Standards, but the national standards as well. In recommend-
ations for final action on MATEP, the Department found that:
The existing Massachusetts and National annual average
NO2 Ambient Air Quality Standard is not adequate by
itself to protect public healt'a especially that of a
susceptirle population.3
This statement and the final decision are crucial
for yet another reason which relates to the third goal of
the Department, "making certain that measures to implement
the AAQS are no more stringent and costly than necessary".
At present, there is no national standard for
short-term emissions of NO2. A federal EPA short-term
standard is not expected until August 1978. MATEP as pro-
posed does meet current state and national standards for
N02 emissions. Were EPA to review the plant, they would have
to approve it based on those standards.
The Department has determined that operation of
MATEP will not cause or contribute to a violation
of the angual average NO2 Ambient Air Quality
Standard.
Consequently, DEQE was faced with a major dilemma.
While MATEP met the established standards, it is arguable
that the long-term standards are not sufficient for the
critically receptive (highly susceptible) area in which the
plant would be located. As a result, DEQE established a
short-term standard (based on expert testimony and comprehen-
sive information) which in turn led to disapproval of the
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diesel engine portion of the plant,
According to state regulations (Chapter 494 of the
Acts of 1974), the state (and subsequently in this case
the Department) cannot establish standards which are more
stringent than federal standards. Therefore, the issue rests
on what the federal standard will be. Although MASCO filed
an appeal to the final decision on 10 February 1978, should
the federal standard, when established, prove to be less
stringent than the one DEQE has set, the issue of the diesel
engines may resurface.
The attempt to achieve departmental goals and pro-
tect the public health is further emphasized in a statement
made by DAHM Director, Dr. Anthony Cortese, during a staff
meeting 11 January 1978:
S. .Why shouldn't the community have a right to decide
about their air space?.,. (In fact), who is the community
and who decides the use of air space?.. .(Or should
decisions be made on a) first come, first served basis?
...The major dilemma for DAHM is the air quality and
the effects on public health standards.5
The goals of DEQE and the decision/criteria involved
in the process which reflect those goals are summarized in
Table 7.
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CRITERIA/DECISIONS
(1) Attain and maintain the Massachusetts and
National Ambient Air Quality Standards designed
to protect the public from any known or antici-
pated adverse health effects and control the
emission of hazardous materials into the
atmosphere.
(2) Attain and maintain the Massachusetts and
National Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards
and prevent and eliminate airborne nuisance
conditions to avoid interference with public
comfort, safety, or convenience or with the full
use and enjoyment of property.
(3) Enhance air quality to the extent possible
consistent with other goals and needs of the
Commonwealth, making certain that measures to
implement the AAQS are no more stringent and
costly than necessary.4 5
(1) Decision to shut down
existing power plant on
Blackfan Street.
(2) Recommendation to MASCO
to install electrostatic
precipitators to control
particulate emissions.
(3) Departmental concern for
public health.
(4) Recognition that current
state and national
standards for NO2 were
inadequate to protect
the public health.
(5) Establishment of a
short-term NO2 standard
to ensure protection
of the public health.
GOALS
TABLE 7
0
OUTSIDE PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROCESS (EXTERNAL SUFFICIENCY)
Outside perceptions of DEQE's actions in the MATEP
process were never favorable. From the earliest decision
to approve excavation to the final decision disapproving
the diesels, DEQE bore the brunt of antagonistic opposition.
In part, the opposition was geared toward the proposed plant
in general. However, most of the oppostion and criticism
that DEQE received was a direct result of the inadequacies
of their process.
The inadequacies in the process became most evi-
dent initially with DEQE's reversal of the proposed decision,
and subsequently with the decision to bifurcate. Critics of
the process accused the department of behind-the-scenes
activity with Harvard, special biased treatment and a general
lack of concern for public health interest.6 Attorney
Daniel G. Partan, chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Harvard Energy Plant commented that "the procedure followed
by the department in abandoning their original decision in
favor of the final decision effectively excluded Brookline
and other interested parties"
In response to the criticism, DEQE Commissioner
David Standley said:
We think the public has been treated adequately and
been given adequate access to the decision. So far as
I know, all communications have been answered, whet er
by myself or a senior staff member is not relevant.
The elitist attitude of DEQE coupled with their
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inability to cope and/or communicate effectively with the
public was a key source of the negative outside perceptions
of the process.
The DEQE decision to bifurcate did little to
dissuade and much to increase criticism of the process. The
overwhelming perception was that DEQE was once again acting
with the interest of Harvard, rather than the public in
mind. Michael Lambert, a Mission Hill resident stated that
"it has become apparent that the basis of many of these
approvals has been precedent and prestige
One of the principal reasons given by DEQE for
bifurcation of the decision and division of the hearings
was to allow opponents time to study and react to new informa-
tion on the NO2 issue.
Attendants at the hearing did not view the decision
in the same way that DEQE did, As one person commented,
"bifurcation is simply a means of easing into full approval,
of fragmenting important issues into meaningless parts".10
While it is not clear that all the opposition and
criticism directed at DEQE was a result of a faulty process,
it is clear that the process had several inadequacies and
that in general, outside perceptions of the DEQE process
put DEQE in a position as apparently poor regulators, managers,
and "protectors of the public interest".
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DECISION MODEL VS. ACTUAL PROCESS/THEORETICAL ADEQUACY
From the two previous sections in Chapter Four, it
is evident that the decision-making process employed by DEQE
relative to the MATEP proposal was not entirely representative
of either an ideal decision-making model or of the decision-
making model promulgated by DEQE regulations.
The purpose of this section is to examine the three
models in more detail in order to compare the idealized with
the actual and to attempt to account for the discrepancies
and deviations which occurred in the actual DEQE decision-making
process.
To accomplish this objective, this section of
Chapter Four is divided into three parts. Part One compares
the ideal decision-making model forumlated in Chapter Two
with the actual process used by DEOE.
Part Two compares the model provided for DEQE by
its regulations with the actual process employed.
Part Three of the section presents a general
summary and conclusions regarding the overall effectiveness
of the DEQE decision-making process and the effectiveness of
DEOE as a regulatory agency.
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Part One
Ideal Model vs. DEQE Process
The concept that becomes most clear in the following
analyses is that there exists no set model for a decision-making
process and very often, depending on the range and complexity
of issues involved in a particular case, the ideal, sequential
model may be abandoned in lieu of a series of loop-arounds or
start overs in order to deal more effectively with new problems,
data or criteria for solutions. This concept, as will be
evidenced in the analyses, was the case with the MATEP propo-
sal.
In Chapter Two, nine steps were identified as ideal
components of a decision-making process. Each step will be
discussed again in turn, with particular attention to the
MATEP decision.
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
As stated in Chapter Two, problem identification
deals with having an issue come into focus and be acknowledged
as a Droblem warranting solution. The first problem to be
identified with respect to MATEP dealt with the issue of the
existing Blackfan Street powerhouse.
The plant as it presently exists was determined
by DEQE to be a major source of pollution to the environment,
and required that some solution or alternative to the pollu-
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tion emissions from the plant be prescribed. As discussed in
Chapter Three, the alternative proposed was MATEP.
From this point until the time that the NO2 emissions
became recognized as a problem, there is no evidence of any
major problem identification on the part of DEQE. The word
major is important in this analysis because although a series
of small issues did arise relative to MATEP (i.e., particulate
emissions), none of these issues seriously altered the origin-
al disposition to positively support MATEP throughout the
formal regulatory process. This disposition affected DEQE in
that small issues which may have surfaced as problems during
the initial stages of the process were handled by DEQE in a
somewhat secretive manner, and were, for the most part, kept
out of the direct attention of the public.
The second major problem identified by DEQE in their
process related to the issue of NO2 emissions from the diesel
engine portion of the proposed plant. This problem actually
turned out to be two problems and is indicative of the first
loop-around in the overall DEQE process.
Correspondence in the Department's files shows that
in June of 1976, DEQE had been engaged in discussions with
United Engineers (MATEP construction company) related to the
monitoring measures used for NO2 emissions. The correspondence
75
shows that United Engineers did not agree with the results of
DEQE monitoring measures- which showed a non-attainment
ambient air quality status for the general area of the proposed
plant. Concerned that this data might adversely affect MATEP,
United Engineers requested and received approval from DEQE
to conduct their own tests of the air quality. The data they
collected showed that the annual air quality standards for NO2
emissions were being met and that the proposed facility would
not violate those standards.
Subsequently in July of 1977 the Department, still
apparently concerned about the NO2 emissions, initiated its own
in-depth analysis of the issue. This resulted in problem
re-identification, or more accurately, problem identification
number two, related more specifically to the short-term
standard for NO2.
In a letter dated 4 August 1977, to Dr. David
Ozonoff of the Boston University School of Medicine, the
Department wrote:
The design and location of this particular facility
has raised a major. question concerning the necessity
of a short term ambient air quality standard for
nitrogen dioxide (NO2)'
The Department's concern has developed from recent
information which has been received indicating that
a short term air quality standard for NO2 may be necessary
to protect public health...Based on this information
and/or any other information to which you may have
access, (we) would appreciate your response to the
following questions:
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1. Do you consider the current NO2 standard of an
annual average of 100 ugm/M3 to be adequate for
the protection of public health?
2. Do you believe that a short term (1 hour and/or 24
hour) standard is also necessary?
3. The impact of the proposed facility is shown in the
table below. Do you believe the increased NO2 con-
centrations create a threat to public health? 11
Internal Department memoranda in July, 1977 also
relates to the existing annual standard for NO2 emissions
and the legalities involved in DEQE contemplations over
establishing a short-term standard:
Can the Department prohibit the emissions of NO2from the MASCO plant and deny a portion of this
plan when there is no violation of an emission
limitation and no projected.violation of an
ambient standard?... The standard is either not
stringent enough, or there should be a short-term
standard. 12
PROBLEM DEFINITION
The area of problem definition for DEQE followed
the same two-part strategy as did problem identification.
The initial problem defined related to the existing
powerhouse. Based primarily on technical standards for air
quality, this issue did not prove difficult or complex in
the area of definition, because the plant clearly violated
pollution standards.
The more difficult issue of definition surfaced
with respect to the NO2 emissions. The complexity rested
in the fact that the proposed plant did not violate existing
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standards for NO2 emissions. This meant that DEQE had to
clearly define the specifics related to the NO2 issue in order
to proceed with the process.
The complexity of the problem definition is further
evidenced by the Department's decision to bifucate. Although
they had been collecting information on NO2 since July of 1977,
by the time of the first hearing in November 1977, the Depart-
ment had not as yet defined the problem to the extent that
they could continue the process to completion, i.e., make a
decision on the entire MATEP proposal.
In terms of an ideal model, the decision to bifurcate
represented DEQE splitting one decision-making process into
two. They subsequently made a decision on what may be called
decision process number one (steam and chilled water), while
remaining at the primary stages of decision process number
two (diesel engines).
DATA COLLECTION
There existed no formal process of data collection
for DEQE to make a decision on the Blackfan Street plant.
Rather, the decision was made using standard technical data
on air quality and air quality standards.
As far as the MATEP proposal was concerned, the pro-
cess of data collection was probably the most important step
for DEQE in their decision-making process.
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At the time they initiated data collection on NO2,
the Department had only a sense that existing NO2 standards
were inadequate to protect the public health. This placed
an important though perhaps lately recognized burden on
DEQE to collect enough information so that they would be
able to proceed in good faith with a final decision.
Data collection related to NO2 began in July 1977,
and lasted almost until the final decision was made in
January 1978. In an effort to collect relevant data, DEQE
consulted medical experts around the world on the health effects
of NO2. In addition, testimony at the public hearings from
public agencies and organizations such as the Department of
Public Health, the World Health Organization and the American
Lung Association, provided DEQE with additional data on NO2.
A summary of the expert opinions received along with
an example of the correspondence used to ellicit data appears
in Appendix C.
The Department also consulted a range of published
material on the issue of NO2 which included:
o "Environmental Health Criteria for Oxides of
Nitrogen", World Health Organization, 1977.
o "Occupational exposure to Oxides of Nitrogen--
Criteria for a Recommended Standard". National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
March, 1976.
o "Health Effects for Short-Term Exposures to
Nitrogen Dioxide", U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, December, 1977.
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o "Ambient Air Quality Standards" 13California Air
Resources Board, January, 1970.
A comprehensive DEQE bibliography appears in
Appendix C.
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
Problem analysis is directly related to data collec-
tion and in the case of DEQE the two stages occurred simultan-
eously. With respect to the first decision (steam and chilled
water), problem analysis involved assessing the impact the
steam and chilled water portion of the proposed plant would
have on the community.
Problem analysis for the second decision related to
the diesel engine portion of the proposed plant. As DEQE
received additional information relating to short and long-term
NO2 standards, they reviewed the data, ostensibly with the
goal of protection of the public health in mind.
During this phase of the process, as well as during
data collection, it began to become clear that the current
standards for NO2 were inadequate and that some alternative
would have to be found.
ESTABLISH SOLUTION CRITERIA
The solution criteria for the first decision was
based on technical ambient air quality standards.
80
With increasing amounts of data in hand on NO2
emissions, DEQE was faced with establishing solution criteria
(the minimum standards for the decision).
One of the primary concerns for DEQE centerd around
adequate protection of the public health. As DEQE was presen-
ted with more and more evidence, it became increasingly clear
that current NO2 standards would not meet this objective.
Consequently, the minimum standard for solution should have
as its goal protection of the public health. This resulted
in the DEQE decision to establish a short-term standard for
NO2 emissions.
It should be recognized that this minumum standard
did not exist for DEQE from the beginning of the process. If
it had, the process may not have lasted as long as it did,
and in addition may not have been characterized by as much of
the backing up and turning around as was evident. It was
not until DEQE was presented with almost irrefutable informa-
tion that concern for the public health became an issue or
a standard.
EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The options availabe to DEQE with respect to the
proposed plant were:
o Approve the total plant (using existing NO2 standards)
o Disapprove the total plant without bifurcation
(based on new NO2 standards)
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o Approve the steam and chilled water portion/delay
the diesel engine portion decision (bifurcation)
o Approve the steam and chilled water portion/disapprove
the diesel engine portion (bifurcation)
SELECTION OF THE SOLUTION
As it turned out, DEQE selected the third and fourth
options listed in the previous section. DEQE approved the
steam and chilled water portion of the plant, delaying the
decision on the diesel engines. Subsequently they did make a
final decision on the diesel engines, disapproving that portion
of the plant.
Given a standard for solution (protection of the
public health) along with the evidence on short-level NO2
emissions, DEQE was faced with deciding what, if anything, to
do about the diesel engine portion of the proposed plant.
Complicating the issue was the political climate which had
existed at DEQE since the initial MATEP application, and which
allowed for as much assistance to Harvard as was possible.
The questions facing DEQE at this stage were twofold.
Should DEQE,
o maintain the support of Harvard, risking community
opposition, or
o resort to a bold new technical standard, risking
almost everyone being upset?
The politics and complexity of these questions were
tremendous. On one hand, DEQE had the health and-welfare of
82
the community to consider and, although it did not effectively
recognize or act upon this concept until late in the process,
this fact had always existed as a Department goal. On the
other hand, DEQE had the previously established alliance with
Harvard to consider. Thus, the Department had to choose between
political affinity and protection of the public health.
Given the evidence that had been collected on NO2 and
its effect on the public health, the Department decided that it
was necessary to establish a short-term standard for NO2 emissions.
In reaching this conclusion, DEQE also had to take into account
the Massachusetts regulations which prohibit DEQE from establish-
ing state standards which are more stringent than federal
standards. This consideration was more futuristic than imminent
since at present there is no federal standard for short-term
NO2 emissions.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOLUTION
Although the diesel engine portion of the proposed
plant met the requirements of the annual NO2 emissions standards,
the plant did not meet the requirements of the newly established
short-term standards. Harvard, in response to DEQE inquiries,
had amended the design of the plant to more effectively control
NO2 emissions. Despite these design revisions, the plant still
fell short of meeting the new standards. Consequently, imple-
mentation of the solution meant disapproving the diesel engine
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portion of the plant,
Here again, DEQE was faced with a choice between
political allinace and protection of the public health. The
solution finally chosen by the Department was disapproval of
the diesel engines although a previous decision had been made
to approve the steam and chilled water portion of the plant.
EVALUATION OF THE DECISION
Decision evaluation involves an assessment of the
applied decision, noting how well the decison worked, the
adequacy of the selection standards and criteria, as well as
the results of the decision (anticipated or unanticipated).
Evaluation of the NO2 decision by itself does not
provide and equitable framework for an evaluation of the entire
decision-making process. The NO2 decision turned out to be a
reasonable one with respect to the public health, but does not
account for the many discrepancies which occurred throughout
the entire process.
Consequently, a complete evaluation and discussion
of the DEQE decision process appears in Part Three of this
section.
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Part Two
Regulatory Model vs:. DEQE Process
The model prescribed for DEQE in MEPA and Department
regulations for approval of a project such as the one proposed
by MASCO, follows a clear series of steps. These steps are
detailed in Table 4 (page 35).
The first seven steps, which relate to approval of
the Environmental Impact Report (EIR), basically followed the
regulatory model. It should be noted that this initial stage
involved only minimal input on the part of DEQE and did not
require the Department to make any decisions other than
suggestions to the proposer (Harvard) related to the EIR.
The first diversion from the established process
occurred at the time Harvard first submitted an Air Quality
Permit application (February 1976). As discussed in Chapter
Three, DEQE suggested that Harvard withdraw their initial
application in lieu of a more acceptable proposal. The
regulatory model does not provide for such an action on the
part of the Department. The decision was made solely at the
discretion of DEQE and is linked to their initial commitment
to approving MATEP.
The next major diversion from the regulatory model
took place at the time DEQE granted Harvard permission to
begin excavation and foundation work pending approval of their
Air Quality Permit application. DEQE regulations specifically
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state that:
No person shall construct, substantially recon-
struct, or alter any facility regulated herein...
unless the plans, specifications, proposed Standard
Operating Procedure and the Proposed Maintenance
Operating Procedure. for such facility have been
submitted to the Department for approval and a royal
has been granted in writing...(emphasis added i 4
It is quite clear that DEQE altered the regualtions
in allowing excavation to begin. This decision was a subjec-
tive one on the part of the Department and makes the alliance
that existed between builder and regulator even more apparant.
In an interpretation of the rules and regulation DEQE
Commissioner David Standley wrote:
However, I believe a certain degree of flexibility
is provided the Department with regard to the nature
of plan approval. In the case of MATEP, or any other
facility which has unique construction scheduling
considerations, excavation could be allowed on the
basis of approving preliminary plans and specifica-
tions, a submission involving less detail than final
plans and specifications, but constituting a firm
commitmgt to a specific course of action and final
design.
This interpretation, clearly a digression from the
rules and regulations of the Department, formed the basis for
the 16 November 1977 DEQE decision to allow excavation and
foundation work to begin.
According to the regulatory model, following receipt
of an Air Quality Permit application, the Department reviews
the application, issues a proposed decision, holds a 30 day
comment period and optional public hearing on the proposed
decision and subsequently, issues a final decision, either
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approving or disapproving the permit application.
During.this series of steps, DEOE actions diverged
once again from the regulatory model. During the early part
of October 1977, the Department was prepared to issue a
proposed decision disapproving the MATEP application. They
postponed announcement of this decision three times in an
effort to allow Harvard to amend, once again, its permit
application. When the proposed decision was finally announced
on 28 October 1977, it was for approval of the application.
On 29 November 1977, one day prior to the scheduled
public hearing, the Department announced plans to bifurcate
the final decision into two parts, one dealing with the
steam and chilled water portion of the plant, and the other
with the diesel engine portion of the plant. Bifurcation of
a decision was a method which made its Department debut in the
MATEP case. There existed no precedent for any such action
and the regulatory model does not prescribe bifurcation as
part of its process. As a result of the bifurcation, a single,
straightforward, step by step process was divided into two
processes. The Department subsequently issued a final decision
on the first half of their split process, and even later,
issued a final decision on the second half of the sDlit
process.
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Part Three
Evaluation and Summary
The most important aspect of systems action is not
the analytical process, but the actual process of
concerting influence to control the actions of
people in such a way as to induce sufficient compli-
ance without too much adverse spillover.16
The issue, which has been before state environmental
authorities and the public for more than two years
is one of protection of the public health not of the
environment...(It) is simply not an energy conserva-
tion issue. It's a public health issue.1 /
The overall DEQE decision-making process was far from
perfect. It was consistently characterized by political favor-
itism, misdirected goals and ambiguity. Yet, the outcome was
a decision which for the most part, succeeded in protecting
the public health.
The key question with respect to DEQE, then, is does
the end justify the means? Do you evaluate a regulatory agency
on its decisions, or do you take a more careful look at the
processes by which an agency reaches those decisions?
The question is not an easy one, and often a faulty
process may be overshadowed by a shining conclusion. Such was
the case with DEQE. Nevertheless, it is my contention that the
overall DEQE decision-making process left a great deal to be
desired. The fact that the Department made a good decision in
the end cannot hide the fact that they made several errors on
the way to that end.
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The DEQE process was faulty from the very beginning.
Both the decision to allow Harvard to resubmit their Air Quality
Permit application and the decision to allow Harvard to begin
excavation before the application was approved were digressions
from the process detailed in DEQE regulations. This raises the
question of to what extent can a regulatory agency interpret
its own rules and regulations? Undoubtedly, an agency may be
afforded some leaway in administering its rules and regulations,
but should that leaway be taken at the risk of the public health
when ostensibly the role of the agency is protection of the
public health?
MATEP presented DEQE with a unique problem, and the
Department was well into the process before it realized just
how great the problem was. This is evidenced by DEQE's decision
to bifurcate,
Bifurcation, as a formal process, made its debut with
the MATEP case and owes its birth in a large part to the in-
decisiveness and uncertainty of DEQE. The uncertainty of DEQE
is further evidenced by the fact that the Department postposed
announcing their proposed decision three times. This postpone-
ment was due, in part, to the political pressure of Harvard,
but a great deal was due to the fact that DEQE was not entirely
sure just what to do. Both the postponements and the bifurcation
are examples of the "put it off and maybe it will go away"
strategy often employed by decision-makers when the problem seems
a little more than they can handle. Matthew Holden, Jr., writing
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in Pollution Control as a Bargaining Process: An Essay on
Regulatory Decision-Making, states that,
One of the commonest sources of external criticism
is that a particular agency acts as if the problem
"will just go away" if the agency heads wait long
enough.18
Mr. Holden rationalizes this strategy by asserting that it
helps the decision-maker come to a more acceptable decision.
He further states that,
Once a decision-maker takes an action, many results
will be attributed to that action...If those results
are undesirable, it is a sound strategy for the
regulator not to make himself a lightening rod by
moving into a situation so soon that he does attract
such attributions to himself. One major kind of
delay, therefore, is that which simply permits an
inevitable situation to develop so far that the 19decision-maker does not get any of the blame for it.
DEQE definitely employed this type of strategy in their
decision-making process. The problem of MATEP was one that would
not just "go away." The Department was forced to make some sort
of decision and was faced with getting a certain amount of
"blame" from one side or another, no matter what choice they
made. DEQE subsequently put off making the decision f&r as
long as they could, first by postponement and, second, by bifur-
cation -- both actions done under the pretense of eliciting ad-
ditional data for their decisions.
The effectiveness of the DEQE process was hampered
by yet another factor. Ostensibly, DEQE is a guardian of the
public interest. Unfortunately, the Department was not well
versed in exactly what the role entailed. Early in the process
DEQE ignored protection of the public health for political
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affinity with Harvard. Even as the process progressed and DEQE
began to become more cognizant of its regulatory role, it failed
miserably in its ability to communicate with the public in a
manner which should be representative of a public agency.
Although the public hearings were an optional part of
the DEQE process, they were very much necessary, given the scope
of the issues involved. The manner in which they were handled
left much to be desired, and quite often the hearings were
characterized by unresponsivness and elitism on the part of
DEQE.
The political alliance of DEQE with Harvard was yet
another flaw in the overall process. DEQE was convinced very
early on that the proposed plant was indeed a sound idea and
became committed to helping Harvard obtain the necessary approval.
While it is understandable that an agency such as DEQE may, in
the best interests of the public, attempt to aid a proposer,
that assistance should not be a factor which promotes the overt
sacrifice of the public health.
It is unfortunate that DEQE did not recognize, or
perhaps more aptly, chose to ignore, its primary mission for
such a long period of time. The result, to be quite blunt, was
as extremely haphazard decision-making process which, in turn,
may have meant the detriment of thousands of residents in the
area of the proposed plant.
In all fairness to DEQE, the Department did succeed in
making a sound decision in the end. With that decision came new
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praise from the opponents and sharp criticism from the
proponents of the proposed plant.
The Department itself, or at least the Commissioner,
felt that the job accomplished was a good one. In a general
letter to DEQE staff following the 31 January final decision,
DEQE Commissioner David Standley wrote:
To those involved in the MATEP decision, from the
typists to the decision-makers, I wish to extend
my appreciation for a most unusual effort. A high
degree of professionalism and dedication, and an
extraordinary effort, went into the formulation
and presentation of the decision. Your work
represents a signal event, and will undoubtedly
be reflected in future national decisions. Please
accept my thanks for fully justifying and extending
my confidence in you.2 0
Ironically, although it was David Standley's
decision to allow Harvard to begin excavation, an early fault
in the decision-making process, he subsequently took a
"bystander's" stance to the MATEP process. In a 27 December
1977 letter to a concerned associate he wrote:
Your letter of December 22 urging disapproval of
the "diesel" portion of the proposed MATEP project,
is acknowledged. I am responding personally be-
cause I know you must have given your recommendation
great thought, and because of our long and harmonious
association...I have deliberately kept a certain
distance between myself and the decision process
to date, (emphasis added) dealing with principles
and process, and mainly leaving determination of
fact and law to Cortese, McLoughlin, Pope, et al,
knowing that appeals to me from their decision are
nearly certain.
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If I come to share your opinion, or determine as
a fact, that life and health would be significantly
at risk as a result of the construction and opera-
tion of this facility, you may be certain it will
be disapproved. We are habitually conservative in
these matters. The testimony, opinion, and data
are now under review. No further expression of
opinion on my part is appropriate at this time.2
1
Apparently, when writing the preceeding letter,
Commissioner Standley "forgot" about his earlier critical
involvement in the MATEP decision-making process.
Much of the success of the final decision is the
result of the efforts of Dr. Cortese. Dr. Cortese succeeded
in redirecting the actions of the agency to more closely
reflect its goals. The result of his efforts was a final
decision which indeed served to protect the public health.
Yet, despite the commitment of Dr. Cortese to the public,
the fact remains that the overall DEQE process was far from
adequate.
The inadequacy of the DEQE decision-making process
brings to light the importance of carefully mixing the
technical background of engineers with a knowledge of and
respect for the public health. The Department was able to
cope relatively well with those decisions requiring only
technical standards for successful implementation. When the
public and the public health, interest and welfare became a
key issue, DEQE lost considerable ground.
Perhaps DEQE has learned something from the MATEP
process. At the very least, they are a little more cognizant
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of their primary goal to protect the public health. Hopefully,
this knowledge will go a long way toward enhancing future
DEQE decision-making processes.
Nevertheless, until such time as regulatory agencies
learn to balance technicity with the public interest (and the
sociocultural factors which are a part of the public interest),
we will continue to see more misdirected goals, more political
bargaining and, as a result, increasingly more unsuccessful
decision-making processes.
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APPENDIX A
LOCATIONAL MAPS OF MATEP SITE
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APPENDIX B
DIAGRAMS OF PROPOSED PLANT
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APPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF DEQE EXPERT OPINIONS
EXEMPLARY LETTER
DEQE NO2 RELATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Summary of Expert Opinions
51. Gustave Freeman, M.D., SRI August 16
. Annual NAAQS marginal to protect health
. Hourly AAQS needed
. Shouldn't consider N02 alone - usually combined with 03
. 03 19-20 times more toxic than N02
. High risk population makes DEQE concern real
. No recommended number
*2. Richard Ehrlich, Ph.D., Director of Life Sciences August 24
Research, IIT Research Institute (microbiologist)
. Annual NAAQS not adequate to protect health
. 1-3 hour AAQS needed
. Children, elderly and people with preexisting disease most
susceptible to air pollution (concern for MATEP real)
. Recommends 450 ug/M3 for 1-3 hours
SF= 2-3
*3. William Jurgelski, M.D., Ph.D., Medical Officer, August 26
NIES
. Concern for MATEP well-founded
. Annual NAAQS not adequate to protect health
. Short-term NAAQS needed
. Daily average of 20 ug/M3 needed for comfort of
vulnerable population
. Suggests minimum SF of 3 from 940 ug/M3 threshold
(possibly 5)
*4. John Knelson, M.D., Director, Health Effects Research Sept. 2
Lab, EPA
No comment on annual NAAQS
Need short-term AAQS
. Concern for MATEP real
Recommends SF of 3-5; greater for susceptible
population
5. John F. Finklea, M.D., Director, NIOSH Sept. 7
. NIOSH recommends 1 ppm (1900 ug/M3 ) for 15 minutes
for workers
- not applicable to general population
. Annual NAAQS adequate for sustained exposures
. Short-term AAQS needed
. Concern for MATEP impact real
. No recommendation
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*6. Dr. V. B. Vouk, Director Control of Environmental Sept. 30
Pollution and Hazards, Division of Environmental
Health, WHO
. WHO Expert Committee recommendations
. Couldn't recommend long-term NAAQS
. Recommends 190-320 ug/M3 for 1 hour
- SF = 3-5
- May need greater SF
. interaction of N02 with other pollutants
. susceptible populations
*T. Carl M. Shy, M.D., Dr. P.H., Professor of Epidemilogy, Nov. 10
University of North Carolina
. Support WHO recommendations (190-320 ug/M3 )
. Short-term AAQS needed
. Orehek study well designed and a propos
**8. Benjamin G. Ferris, Jr., M.D., Professor of Dec. 2
Physiology, Harvard School of Public Health
. Orehek study vAlid; however:
- not replicated
- effects at higher levels not seen
- no clinical symptons
. Recommends 480 ug/M3 for 1 hour
**9. David Kinloch, M.D. and Morton Madoff, M.D., Dec. 19
Deputy Commissioners Mass. Dept. of Public Health
. Short-term AAQS necessary
. Recommend 190 ug/M3 for 1 hour
. Area impacted by plant contains susceptible
population
*10. Sadamu Ishikawa, M.D., Assoc. Professor of Medicine, Dec. 19
Tufts Medical School and Director of Pulmonary Function
Laboratory at Lemuel Shattuck Hospital
WHO recommendation of 190-320 ug/M 3 for 1 hour
. MATEP will violate WHO standard
. Transformation products of NOx (HNO3 aerosol and N03~)
make addition of large NOx source imprudent
. Area of impact has extremely susceptible population
- 2nd highest % of elderly in country
- 59,000 susceptible people in area
* Responded to August, 1977 DAHM inquiry
* Responded to letter on Orehek study (November, 1977)
* Written or oral testimony at public hearings
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*11. John Hermos, M.D., Boston University School of Medicine
. Sought advice of other pulmonary physicians
on significance of Orehek study
. Dr. Gordon Snider, Chief of Pulmonary Medicine, BU
Medical School
- Orehek findings relevant to real situation
. Dr. Frank Davidson, Asst Professor of Medicine, BU
School of Medicine
- Orehek findings relevant to real situation
. Dr. Marc B. Schenker, Fellow in Pulmonary Medicine,
Tufts - New England Medical Center
- Orehek findings relevant to real situation
- Enormous clinical significance to Orehek study
. Asthma most common chronic childhood disease
. Close relationship between resp disorders in childhood
plus prevalence of obstructive airway disease in adults
. 190-320 ug/M3 provides marginal protection
. Prolonged subclinical effect may have dieterious clinical
effect later
. Dr. Stanley Rokaw, Medical Director of California Lung Association
- views Orehek study of great concern
- findings relevant to real situation
. Hermos sees 190 ug/M3 for 1 hour as essential
. Solburt Permutt, Professor of Medicine and Environmental Medicine,
Johns Hopkins University
- Increased airway reactivity linked to predisposition to
serious chronic diseases
- Orehek study of great concern
012. Frank E. Speizer, M.D., Associate Professor in Medicine, January 17, 1978
Harvard Medical School
. Orehek study needs to be repeated
. Does not believe Orehek effects, i.e., increased airway resistance
should be considered adverse at this time
. Recommends 480 ug/M3 for 1 hour
'.3. James L. Whittenberger, M.D., Professor of Physiology, January 17, 1978
Harvard School of Public Health
. Short-term AAQS needed
. Orehek study important but needs confirmation
. WHO recommendation is conservative
. Recommends 470 ug/M3 for 1 hour
* Responded to August, 1977 DAHM inquiry
* Responded to letter on Orehek study (November, 1977)
* Written or -oral testimony at public hearings
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Dec. 19
Summay Statistics
Total Respondents 19
Recommend 450-480 ug/M3 for 1 hour 4
Recommend 190-320 ug/M3 for 1 hour 5
Recommend 190- ugAM3 for 1 hour 8
No recommendation 2
Summary of Advisory Committee Opiniens
1. John J. Marino, Commissioner, Mass. Dept. of Commerce and Development
Two letters
- August 16, 1977
. Short-term AAQS needed
. Recommends WHO std of 190-320 ug/M3 for 1 hour
. Area with highly susceptible population should be protected
. Questioned need for MATEP since Edison has capacity
- October 3, 1977
. Clarified position of August 16, 1977
. Reversed position on need for MATEP
. Retracts all technical recommendations
. Recommends DEQE work with MATEP for it to go forward in
responsible manner
2. John W. Lebourveau, New England Power Company Aug. 23
. Annual NAAQS adequate for long-term protection
. Short-term AAQS needed
. Favors 2 4-hour standard
. Recommends DEQE std be equivalent to EPA std
. Impact of MATEP as high as should be permitted
3. Thomas W. Devine, Chief, Air Branch, EPA, Region I Aug. 26
. Annual NAAQS adequate for long-term protection
. EPA will set 1-3 hour NAAQS in August, 1978
. No recommendation on AAQS
. Recommend permit conditioned on
- BACT
- All available measures to' mitigate impact
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4. Jane Slaughter, American Lung Association of Aug 30
Massachusetts
. Annual NAAQS not adequate to protect health
. Cites WHO recommendations of 190-320 ug/M3
. Given susceptible population DEQE should be careful of any
increases in pollution
5. Gerald Pkker, Assistant to the Commissioner for Oct 11
Radiological Health, Mass. Dept. of Public Health
. Letter to Dr. Kinloch referred to him
. Supports WHO recommendations of 190-320 ug/M3
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DAVID STANDLEY
COMMISSIONER 600 Washington Street, Boston, Ma. 02111
August 4, 1977
Dr. David Ozonoff
Boston University
School of Medicine
80 East Concord Street
Boston, Ma. 02118
Dear Dr. Ozonoff:
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
is currently evaluating a large fuel combustion facility which will be
located in a heavily populated area in Boston. In the next 60 days, the
Department must decide whether to approve or disapprove the construction
of the facility or require modifications before construction. The
design and location of this particular facility has raised a major
question concerning the necessity of a short term ambient air quality
standard for nitrogen dioxide (NO2)-
In developing answers to this question and in reaching a final
decision on the facility, the Department is seeking broad input from the
public and various highly qualified medical experts. In recognition of
your interest and expertise as a recognized environmental health authority,
we are specifically seeking your comments.
As background on the NO2 question, it should be noted that at present
Metropolitan Boston is meeting the NO2 annual ambient air quality standard
of 100 ug/M 3 (0.05 ppm). While levels are in some cases close to the
standard, the Department does not expect the facility to cause a violation
of the standard. This conclusion is based on a comparison of current
and projected NO2 levels with the NO2 standard.
The Department's concern has developed from recent information which
has been received indicating that a short term air quality standard for
NO2 may be necessary to protect public health. Attached are copies of some
of the material which has been reviewed and a list of other references
that are relevant. Based on this information and/or any other information
to which you may have access, I would appreciate your response to the
following questions:
1. Do you consider the current N02 standard of an annual average
of 100 ugm/M3 to be adequate for the protection of public health?
2. Do you believe that a short term (1 hour and/or 24 hour) standard
is also necessary?
3. The impact of the proposed facility is shown in the table below.
Do you believe the increased NO2 concentrations create a threat
to public health?
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Table
Maximum N02 Levels (ugm/M3)
Averaging Current estimated Contribution of Resulting Air
Time Background Facility Quality Levels
1 hour 400 (0.21 ppm) 445 (0.24 ppm) 845 (0.45 ppm)
24 hour 180 (0.1 ppm) 115 (0.06 ppm) 295 (0.16 ppm)
Annual 90 (0.05 ppm) 2 (40.01 ppm) 92 (0.05 ppm)
4. In your consideration of question #3, what, if any, factor
of safety did you use or would you recomend? (It should be
noted that in this particular case the local area has an
unusually high population of elderly and hospitalized persons).
Obviously, these questions are difficult to answer, especially with
the minimum of information provided in this letter. It may be of some
consolation to know that the Department finds itself in the same boat,
with extremely limited data from which to make a determination. Therefore,
we are most sincere in our request for your input. Since we must act
shortly, we would appreciate your reply by September 2, 1977. If there
are any questions, feel free to contact me or my Deputy Director,
Kenneth Hagg at 727-2658.
Thank you in advance for your assistance.
Very truly yours,
ony D. Cortese,
Director
Division of Air and Hazardous Materials
C- Commissioner Standley
C- DAHM Advisory Committee Members
C- United Engineers & Contractors, Inc.
E/adc/pfam
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Songs to Serenade Harvard By...
Sung to Jingle Bells Sung to Old MacDonald Had a Farm
(Lyrics by Residents United to Stop Harvard) (Lyrics by RUSH)
Blindly through the soot Old John Harvard has a scheme
Of the MASCO factory ee i ee i o
Round the oil trucks To fund his scheme he needs more bucks
We're dodging desperately ee i ee i o
Noise of steam-blast sounds
Scaring us to death With an endowment here
What fun it is to subsidize And a tax break there
What's taking our last breath Here a grant, there a grant
refrain Everywhere a federal grant
Oh, Power Plant, Power Plant That's how John Harvard gets his bucks
Killing Mission Hill ee i ee i o
Oh What fun it is for us,
to smell your oil spill When old John Harvard needs some land
Oh, Power Plant, Power Plant ee i ee i o
With a smokestack high He buys our homes and drives us oyt
How we just adore it ee i ee i o
when we see those ashes fly. With an eviction here
And a land grab there
Here a bite, now its blight
to Santa Claus is Coming to Town Everywher by Harvard's might
(Lyrics by RUSH) That' s how John Harvard gets his land
Oh, you better not sneeze ee i ee i o
You better not swell
You better not wheeze And on this land old John would spend
You better stay well ee i ee i o
Aedicaid is taken away One hundred million for the AHC
ee i ee i o
No matter how sick With a plush lab here
No matter how ill And a private room there
The doctors won't see you Here a frill, there a frill
You can't pay their bill Added on the patient' s bill
Aedicaid is taken away That's how John Harvard gets so big
ee i ee i o
They' ve stopped the medication
They've cut off x-rays too, But old John Harvard needs more power
And still they build the AHC ee i ee i o
And say its all for you MASCOsays twe want it free'
ee i ee i o
Oh, you better not sneeze With a loophole here
You better not swell And City Hall th3re
You better not wheeze Here a ploy, there a ploy
You better stay well Mayor White is Harvard' s boy
Medicaid is t.ken away. That' s how John Harvard' s empire grows
ee i ee i o.
to We Shall Not Be Moved
(Lyrics by RUSH)~~ Sun, to Row Row Your Boat
Chorus; (LyricsTy lH
We rhall not, We shall not be moved Stop the Power Plant
We shall not, We shall not be moved And the AHC
Just like a tree that's standing by the wa:er Medicaid dies and we get sick
We shall not be moved. Yet, Harvard lives tax free.
Harvard is the enemy, We shall not he moved
Chorus Stop the Power Plant
MASCO is mighty... And ths AIIC
Mayor White is on their side... Haevcrd's free 'lectricity
Mission Hill will fight today... 115 Is paid by you and ma.
Health care is no longer ours...
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